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JM. Balkin'
E VERY torts professor has a favorite hypothetical about causal
responsibility-some wildly improbable and outrageous chain of
events triggered by the defendant that somehow leads inexorably to
the plaintiff's injury. I have always been partial to the facts of United
Novelty Co. v. Daniels.2 In Daniels the defendant negligently set the
nineteen-year-old decedent to work cleaning a coin-operated machine
with gasoline; the decedent worked in a small room warmed by a gas
heater with an open flame. The gasoline vapors surrounding the
machine ignited when a rat ran from the machine into the flame,
caught fire, and then ran back toward the machine, causing an explo-
sion that killed the decedent. Naturally, the defendant company
argued that it was not causally responsible for the freak accident.
Nevertheless, the court upheld a jury verdict against the company
because it could have foreseen that setting the decedent to work in the
room under these conditions was unduly dangerous.
The opinion in Daniels takes up barely a page in the reporters, but
within this miniature one can find many of the most common struc-
tures of argument about human moral responsibility that occur in
legal discourse. Consider, for example, the arguments that the
I Professor of Law and Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody Centennial Faculty Fellow,
University of Texas.
2 42 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1949).
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defendant company might make (and probably did make) on its
behalf:
(1) The explosion was caused by the unpredictable movements of a
rat, not by the defendant's negligence.
(2) When the decedent began cleaning the machine with gasoline, it
was completely unforeseeable that a rat would jump out of the
machine, run headlong toward an open flame, catch fire, and then run
back precisely where it could do the most damage.
(3) Decedent was at fault for cleaning the machine with gasoline in
the first place. The decedent must have known of the danger when
the decedent voluntarily began work.
Next consider the plaintiff's likely responses:
(1) Although the rat was the immediate cause of the explosion, the
real cause was the defendant's ordering the decedent to work under
unsafe conditions.
(2) It is completely foreseeable that if you set someone to work in a
small room filled with gas vapors and an open flame, there is an unac-
ceptable risk of an explosion.
(3) The decedent cannot be held responsible for the explosion,
because the decedent was following the orders of the defendant
employer and was a minor.
As one would expect, the defendant's arguments are designed to
minimize the defendant's causal, legal, and moral responsibility, while
the plaintiff's arguments are designed to enhance them. More impor-
tantly, however, each side recharacterizes the facts to support its posi-
tion, emphasizing some details, minimizing or even omitting others-
creating a coherent portrait of the situation from the raw materials of
experience. Like all pictures, these characterizations are selective; for
to record experience is always also to reorder and even to suppress it.
In the second argument presented above, for example, the defendant
describes the situation in minute detail, while the plaintiff speaks in
more general, abstract terms. In this way each side can make plausi-
ble its claim about the foreseeability or unforeseeability of the dece-
dent's injuries.
Most lawyers are well aware that facts can be recharacterized to
support one side of a lawsuit or another. What is more remarkable is
that styles of characterization and recharacterization recur in legal
discourse in relatively standard and predictable forms that can be cat-
alogued and analyzed. This Article is about these styles of factual
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characterization of responsibility-the recurring rhetorical devices
that people use to describe the same event in different terms. The goal
of this Article is to discover and classify the most common of these
structures of argument, and to show how they are implicated in many
diverse areas of the law.
The most important previous discussion of recurring structures of
factual characterization is Professor Mark Kelman's.3 Kelman's arti-
cle, like mahy of the early works of the Critical Legal Studies move-
ment, sought to break down previously unexamined assumptions
about the rationality and the apolitical nature of law. Thus, Kelman
sought to show that through conscious and unconscious "interpretive
constructions," as he called them, "we are nonrationally constructing
the legal world."14 Because legal argument was largely nonrational
and political, Kelman argued, the existing system of rules could not
be justified by reason alone.
My purpose in investigating the rhetoric of responsibility is quite
different. Uncovering the rhetorical structures of moral and legal
argument does not establish that law is irrational. Law is a rational
activity because lawyers make arguments about what the law is and
what it should be, and attempt to convince others of the rightness of
their views. 6 For me, the central issue in the study of factual charac-
terizations begun by Kelman is not rationality but ideology. We rea-
son about legal issues, but we always do so within an ideological
framework that gives coherence and meaning to our debates.7 The
nature of the framework in which our rationality is inscribed is the
concern of this Article.
3 Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 591
(1981).
4 Id. at 672.
5 Id. at 671.
6 Our confidence that law is a rational activity, however, does not automatically legitimate
law in general or our legal system in particular. To be sure, we might think reasoned argument
is desirable as a normative matter. Yet reasoned argument neither necessarily guarantees nor
necessarily frustrates justice and fairness. Rather, it is simply a means through which justice
and fairness are discussed.
7 Here I must emphasize that as I use it, the term "ideology" has no necessarily pejorative
connotations, such as those of false consciousness. Ideological thinking is largely unavoidable
for social beings, and ideologies may differ widely in their degrees of functionality or
disfunctionality, and in their liberating or oppressive characteristics. See Balkin, Taking




Just as the grammatical structure of a language can be revealed by
carefully studying actual spoken and written examples, the ideological
structure of legal and moral argument can be unearthed by carefully
studying actual legal and moral rhetoric. This methodology does not
seek to demonstrate that the rhetoric of responsibility is irrational, or
even a subterfuge for base political motivation or unseemly prejudice.
Rather, the goal is to take what people say very seriously indeed,
because within our speech we will discover the building blocks of ide-
ology-the background structure that supports our conceptions of
reason.
The linguistic analogy just given is not accidental. This Article is
part of an ongoing project of developing a semiotics of legal dis-
course-that is, understanding legal discourse as a system of interre-
lated signs, much lke a language. 8 As I hope to show, many of the
most common rhetorical devices concerning human responsibility
come in sets of opposing pairs, with each opposed device a transfor-
mation of the other. The rhetoric of human responsibility thus dis-
plays its semiotic or linguistic character; for language, and indeed,
any system of signs, can be shown to be structured in a system of
mutually self-defining relations. 9 Thus, one might say that the rhetor-
ical devices that I discuss here form a "language" of available argu-
ments about human responsibility.
If factual characterizations about human responsibility are struc-
tured like a language, they can be used either consciously or uncon-
sciously, just like a language. A native speaker of a language
normally does not consciously consider the grammatical, semantical,
and phonological constructs that enable her to speak and understand
others. The fact that her understanding is somehow unconscious,
however, does not preclude others from learning the language by con-
sciously practicing these constructs; nor does it preclude the native
speaker herself from learning more about her own language by a
8 For an introduction to semiotics, or the study of signs and systems of signification, see R.
Barthes, Elements of Semiology (1968); J. Culler, The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature,
Deconstruction (1981); J. Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the
Study of Literature (1975); U. Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (1976); T. Hawkes, Structuralism
and Semiotics (1977); R. Scholes, Structuralism in Literature: An Introduction (1974). For
recent applications to law see B. Jackson, Semiotics and Legal Theory (1985); R. Kevelson,
The Law as a System of Signs (1988).
9 For the classic statement of this approach, see F. De Saussure, Course in General
Linguistics (W. Baskin trans. 1959).
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study of grammar, semantics, and phonology. The latter reason is
why we teach our children English in school, even if they are native
speakers of the language.
Thus, it is quite possible to identify the "deep structures" of argu-
ment about human responsibility and to practice them consciously.
There are good reasons to undertake such an exercise. First, we can
use these structures to make our arguments more convincing, and we
can identify them in the arguments of others to analyze and rebut
their arguments. If your opponent makes her position seem stronger
by cleverly manipulating time frames and descriptions of causality, it
is certainly a valuable skill to be able to identify these rhetorical
moves and turn them on their heads. Thus, a semiotics of human
responsibility is clearly relevant to the study of legal rhetoric in gen-
eral and, hence, to the goal of persuasive advocacy.
Moreover, as discussed above, an important reason to study these
structures of argument is to discover important features of our legal
and political ideology. Ideological thinking can be distinguished by
the way in which it characterizes issues of human responsibility and
desert. The success of an ideology consists precisely in its ability to
make its assumptions seem natural or transparent to the mind.'0
Thus, the study of the semiotics of responsibility is important to any-
one who wants to understand how ideologies work in general and how
ours work in particular.
Finally, a semiotics of responsibility has a therapeutic value. Once
we see that existing views of human responsibility are merely con-
structs that are alternatively adopted and discarded in successive situ-
ations, we will understand that they are not necessary concomitants of
the concepts of moral responsibility and desert. Thus, articulating the
interpretive constructs in moral and legal discourse about human
responsibility, making what is unconscious conscious, may have an
enlightening effect; it may help us to understand legal and moral
issues in a new way.
Part I of this Article provides a terminology for classifying posi-
tions or orientations of greater and lesser responsibility. Building on
these distinctions, Part II discusses techniques for characterizing
descriptions of events that affect conclusions about responsibility,
10 This is no less true for ideologies that we believe to be "true," "good," or "functional"
than it is for ideologies that we disparage as "false consciousness."
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using as examples cases concerning causal probability and foreseeabil-
ity of harm. Part III discusses rhetorical techniques for shifting
responsibility between the defendant and the plaintiff, or onto third
parties. Part IV argues that the same rhetorical techniques outlined
in Parts II and III appear in debates concerning the proper scope of
individual rights. The Article concludes with a brief discussion of
how ideological commitments lead people to characterize responsibil-
ity in different ways.
I. Two ORIENTATIONS OF DISCOURSE
We might begin classifying arguments about responsibility by
establishing different directions or orientations toward responsibility
that can be compared and contrasted with each other. This task is
more difficult than might at first appear. For example, one cannot
speak of greater or lesser degrees of responsibility in the abstract,
because to emphasize one person's responsibility for a sequence of
events is often to deemphasize another's.
One of the most important distinctions in the literature of the Criti-
cal Legal Studies movement does attempt to deal with the problem of
describing, or at least ordering, different degrees of responsibility. I
am referring to Professor Duncan Kennedy's distinction between
"two opposed rhetorical modes for dealing with substantive issues,"11
which he called individualism and altruism. 12 Kennedy described this
distinction as follows:
Confronted with a choice, the decision maker will have available
two sets of stereotypical policy arguments. One "altruist" set of argu-
ments suggests that he should resolve the... [choice] by requiring a
party who injures the other to pay compensation, and also that he
should allow a liberal law of excuse when the injuring party claims to
be somehow not really responsible. The other "individualist" set of
arguments emphasizes that the injured party should have looked out
for himself, rather than demanding that the other renounce freedom
of action, and that the party seeking excuse should have avoided bind-
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ing himself to obligations he couldn't fulfill. 13
Kennedy was careful to emphasize that his concept of individual-
ism is distinct from mere egotism, in that "[tihe notion of self-reliance
has a strong affirmative moral content, the demand for respect for the
rights of others." 14  Thus, individualism also frowned on liberal
excuses for failing to meet expected standards of conduct. Similarly,
his vision of altruism consisted of more than mere self-sacrifice. "It is
motivated by a sense of duty or by a sense that the other's satisfaction
is a reward at least comparable to the satisfaction one might have
derived from consuming the thing oneself."15 Yet "the altruist is
unwilling to carry his premise of solidarity to the extreme of making
everyone responsible for the welfare of everyone else."1 6
According to Kennedy, one could classify rule choices in contract
law according to whether the rule (or its opposite) was relatively indi-
vidualist or altruist. For example, denying contractual liability in the
absence of consideration was relatively individualist, while permitting
recovery in cases of detrimental reliance was relatively altruist.
Implying a duty of good-faith performance in all contracts was rela-
tively altruist, while refusing to imply the duty was relatively
individualist.
Kennedy's distinction worked fairly well to demarcate directions of
greater or lesser responsibility in contract law. It also provided a use-
ful vocabulary for critical analyses of the history of legal thought.
For example, it was easy to see that the general trend of contract law
from the nineteenth century to the twentieth, for example, had been a
movement from individualist doctrines to altruist ones.17 Kennedy's
13 Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 581
(1982).
14 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1715.
15 Id. at 1717.
16 Id. at 1718.
17 Id. at 1731-37. Indeed, one of Kennedy's points was that there had been a simultaneous
movement from rules to standards. Id. at 1686-87. A connection between the form and
substance of legal doctrine was postulated by Kennedy, but this connection does not appear to
exist uniformly outside of contract law. See Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal
Thought, 39 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 45-53 (1986). In partial defense of Kennedy, however, Mark
Kelman has argued that there is an "aesthetic" connection between the "tough-mindedness" of




distinction was widely adopted in critical legal literature.18 It was
ultimately equated with another, somewhat different issue, the mutual
differentiation and dependence of self and other, which Kennedy
called the "fundamental contradiction" of social life. 19
When one moved to tort law or criminal law, however, the distinc-
tion between individualism and altruism quickly became problematic.
According to Kennedy's original definitions, strict liability would be
relatively altruistic in comparison to negligence,20 but so too would be
the rather draconian felony murder rule in criminal law. Moreover,
both strict liability and the insanity defense would be relatively "altru-
istic" positions. The problem arose from Kennedy's faithful depiction
of the late nineteenth century's treatment of excuses and defenses.
Kennedy's individualism deemphasized both liability and the recogni-
tion of excuses and defenses, while altruism emphasized both liability
and recognition of excuses and defenses. Yet in criminal law and tort
law, allowing an excuse or defense often is just another way of dimin-
ishing liability.21 Thus, the distinction between individualism and
altruism, which made some sense in contract law, became incoherent
outside of it.
This theoretical difficulty is not Kennedy's fault but rather is due to
the fact that his description of individualism was based quite deliber-
ately on a historically contingent set of understandings shared by law-
yers and judges in the late nineteenth century, while altruism was
18 See, e.g., Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Law, 94 Yale L.J. 997,
1006, 1025 (1985); Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 829,
838-47 (1983) (individualism versus collectivism); Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics, and
the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L.
Rev. 199, 223-25 (1984); Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497, 1505, 1521-22, 1530, 1557 (1983); Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379, 418-22 (1985); Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in
Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 975 (opposition
between freedom and security).
19 Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buffalo L. Rev. 209, 211-13
(1979). Kennedy's original distinction between individualism and altruism is connected to the
relation between self and other, but it is not identical with it. The mutually dependent and
differentiated relationship of self and other produces many other antinomies that are not
coterminous with individualism and altruism-for example, the antinomy between the
opposed social conceptions I call individualism and communalism.
20 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1729-30.
21 For example, the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk operate very
much like a rule that no duty is owed to the plaintiff under certain circumstances.
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crafted as its mirror opposite.22 These late nineteenth century under-
standings were in conflict with each other, but the tensions were more
or less invisible to persons of that era.23 Thus, the individualism of
the late nineteenth century simultaneously promoted negligence over
strict liability, and an objective standard of negligence over a subjec-
tive standard, even though the arguments for these two positions are
quite different.24 Similarly, lawyers in the late nineteenth century
apparently believed that the question of whether to recognize a
defense or excuse was analytically distinct from the question of
whether a redressable injury had occurred. Thus, it was possible for
them to argue that respect for individual liberty required liability
based wholly on fault and yet not see that this principle taken to its
logical conclusion required the most liberal expansion of excuses or
defenses that were based on lack of fault.25
The first inklings of the recognition of this difficulty can be traced
to Holmes' famous essay, "Privilege, Malice, and Intent, ' ' 26 where he
noted that an affirmative right to act (without liability) also can be
understood as a privilege to do harm.27 Of course, by the time Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld wrote his classic article on fundamental legal con-
ceptions, 28 it was clear that denying defenses and excuses was a way
of increasing one's responsibility to others, and recognizing defenses
and excuses was a way of deemphasizing responsibility for the effects
22 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1713-17, 1728-31.
23 See id. at 1731-37, 1745-51; Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America 1850-1940, 3 Res. L. & Soc. 3
(1980). An obvious example of this tension was the simultaneous assumption that contractual
liability was to be based upon will, and that the standards for determining offer and acceptance
should be objective, even though such a standard might bind a party despite her actual
intentions.
24 Balkin, supra note 17, at 36-39 (arguing for negligence over strict liability is relatively
individualist, but arguing for an objective rather than subjective standard of negligence is
relatively communalist).
25 This contradiction could only be avoided if one assumed that the original crime or tort
was defined in accordance with principles of fault, and that defenses and excuses were
exceptions offered by the state for reasons of mercy or public policy. See Peller, The
Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1151, 1204, 1211 (1985). Indeed, we still talk
this way when we speak of "allowing" or "recognizing" defenses or excuses.
26 Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1894).
27 Id. at 1-6. According to Holmes, the question whether or not a privilege to cause harm
should be recognized was simply a question of the particular factual circumstances, the
intentions of the actor, and the policies the law sought to serve. Id.
28 Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
Yale L.J. 16 (1913).
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of one's behavior.29 This is not to say that in formulating his famous
distinction Kennedy was not conscious of Hohfeldian analytics. If
anything, he was very much motivated and influenced by it.30 Rather,
he was trying to capture the essence of an historical attitude in classi-
cal legal thought that did not accept this Hohfeldian analysis and
therefore ultimately proved to be incoherent.
Kennedy's original distinction was historically appropriate but ana-
lytically unwieldy outside of contract law. A few years ago, I began
to explore and expand on Kennedy's already elaborate classification
scheme for legal arguments.31 I chose an alternative distinction to
describe different orientations toward responsibility. Instead of dis-
tinguishing between values of self-reliance and values of sharing and
self-sacrifice, I drew a distinction between rules that deemphasize a
person's responsibility for the effect of her behavior on others and
rules that emphasize this responsibility. The former I term "individu-
alist," the latter "communalist. ' '32 As we shall see in the next few
pages, my distinction has its own problems of coherence. Its advan-
tage, however, is that these very problems lead us to a deeper under-
standing of legal responsibility and the connections between
responsibility and ideology.
The distinction between individualism and communalism thus clas-
sifies arguments about responsibility according to whether they
emphasize or deemphasize the responsibility of particular persons,
either through rules of liability or through excuses and defenses. For
29 For an excellent discussion of the history of the problem of legally nonredressable harms,
see Singer, supra note 18, at 1025-56.
30 See, e.g., Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 Hofstra L.
Rev. 711, 751-69 (1980), in which the analysis is expressly compared to Hohfeldian analytics.
31 See D. Kennedy, Torts Materials (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Kennedy,
supra note 11; Kennedy, supra note 13; Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument (1988)
(unpublished manuscript). For applications, see Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 Am.
U.L. Rev. 1003, 1040 (1985); Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 Va. L. Rev. 915, 922-23 (1988). My
extension appears in Balkin, supra note 17; Balkin, supra note 7.
32 1 use this term to emphasize a duty or responsibility to others, which may or may not
involve sharing or self-sacrifice. Enforcing the death penalty is a relatively communalist
position, even though one does not normally associate it with altruism on the part of the
defendant. Unfortunately, I have discovered that the word "communalism" is likely to be
confused with "communitarianism," a theoretical position often contrasted with political
liberalism. See M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 59-65 (1982). Communalism,
like individualism, is an orientation about responsibility that one finds within liberal discourse,
not outside of it. And it goes without saying that "communalism" is not at all the same thing
as the position concerning ownership of the means of production known as "communism."
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example, in a tort suit, the plaintiff's best strategy normally is to
emphasize the defendant's responsibility for the plaintiff's condition,
while the defendant's best strategy is to deemphasize it. The defend-
ant's position is individualist, the plaintiff's communalist. Thus, the
felony murder rule and strict products liability are relatively commu-
nalist positions, while negligence, the insanity defense, and the actual
malice rule in libel are relatively individualist.33
Individualism and communalism, however, are not simply orienta-
tions of greater and lesser responsibility in general; they are claims
about the responsibility of particular persons. Thus, while the defend-
ant is likely to deemphasize her own responsibility for harm to others,
she is likely to emphasize the responsibility of the plaintiff for the
plaintiff's own predicament, as well as the responsibility of third par-
ties. Thus, although the insanity defense is a relatively individualist
position because it deemphasizes the defendant's responsibility for her
actions, so too is the defense of contributory negligence because it
emphasizes the plaintiff's responsibility for her own harm.
Conversely, the plaintiff will not simply emphasize the defendant's
responsibility for the harm; she will also deemphasize her own respon-
sibility and that of third parties for her predicament. Thus, if the
felony murder rule is a relatively communalist position because it
emphasizes the defendant's responsibility for any deaths committed in
the course of a felony in which the defendant participated, so too is
the doctrine of last clear chance.
Although it often helps to introduce the distinction between indi-
vidualism and communalism as the distinction between what helps
the defendant and what helps the plaintiff in the standard tort suit,
the distinction does not depend on the procedural posture of the case.
After all, the injured party is not always the plaintiff. For example, in
a declaratory judgment action the traditional roles may be reversed.
In a criminal prosecution, there is a defendant but no private plain-
33 As these examples illustrate, individualism and communalism cut across traditional
political lines. Traditional liberals tend to be much more individualist with respect to speech
and sexual autonomy than traditional conservatives, while exactly the opposite is true with
respect to issues of economic regulation. This neat division is rapidly changing with respect to
speech, however. See Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 Duke L.J. (forthcoming).
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tiff.34 Economic regulations or subsidies may not give rise to any pri-
vate lawsuit, but nevertheless affect the ways in which people are
restrained from injuring others .
3
In order to make sense of the distinction between what increases
and what decreases responsibility for the effects of one's behavior on
others, we necessarily refer to a background set of assumptions about
who is the injurer in a situation and who is the injured, and about
what "being responsible" entails. Suppose the defendant shoots the
plaintiff and attempts to defend her action on the ground that she is a
battered wife and unreasonably (though sincerely) believed that her
husband would kill her.36 Allowing the jury to consider self-defense
under these circumstances is relatively individualist. But this assumes
a perspective in which the injurer is the wife, the injured party is the
husband, and the injury is to the husband's legally protected interest
in bodily security. An alternative perspective would be that the
injurer is the husband, the injured party is the wife, and the injury is
to the wife's interest in protection from systematic physical and
mental abuse. Under this view, allowing consideration of self-defense
by the wife is relatively communalist. Whichever perspective one
believes more appropriate, it is important to recognize that the con-
cepts of injury and responsibility themselves do not determine this
sense of appropriateness. Rather, we impose our perspective on the
situation to give these concepts meaning and coherence.
On a different level, when we say that strict products liability and
the progressive income tax are relatively communalist positions, we
are trading on our understandings about the relationship between var-
ious interest groups and social classes. We might justify these conclu-
sions on the grounds that the progressive income tax makes richer
34 Thus, rules that favor the defense in a criminal case tend to be relatively individualist,
while those that favor the prosecution are relatively communalist.
35 Economic regulations that restrict a business's freedom of contract because of threatened
harm to a particular class (say, consumers or competitors) generally are relatively
communalist, while relaxing such regulations generally is relatively individualist. This is best
seen if one thinks of economic regulations as tort duties added to contractual provisions. See
Kennedy, supra note 13, at 590-94. Redistributive social programs often, although not always,
are relatively communalist, as they emphasize the responsibility of some citizens towards
other, less fortunate, citizens. Conversely, policies that deny governmental protection in the
hope of encouraging persons to take care of themselves usually are relatively individualist.
36 See discussion of Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979), infra text
accompanying notes 89-91.
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people more responsible for the welfare of poorer ones, and strict
products liability makes manufacturers more responsible to consum-
ers. Yet, from another perspective, the progressive income tax allows
the poor to profit from the labors of the rich without recompense; a
rule of strict products liability permits consumers to collect money
from manufacturers through the tort system and otherwise restrict or
penalize their activities.
Once introduced to the distinction between individualism and com-
munalism, most people probably would not conclude that strict prod-
ucts liability or the progressive income tax were individualistic
because they deemphasize the responsibility of certain groups (con-
sumers, poor people) to avoid benefiting at the expense of other
groups (manufacturers, wealthy people). That is because it seems
clear to us from the social context who is the injurer (or the person
being asked for assistance) and who is the injured (or the person
requesting aid). Yet nothing in the concept of responsibility itself
necessitates these conclusions. With suitably perverse determination,
we could understand every individualist rule as communalist from
another vantage point.3 7 We simply would have to take a radically
different perspective on what constitutes responsibility and injury. 8
37 Sometimes remarking on this potential transformability will indeed seem merely perverse;
in other situations, however, it will seem quite appropriate. Consider, for example, the
question whether or not the law should recognize the tort of commercial appropriation of a
person's name or likeness. Suppose that the manufacturer of a breakfast cereal places a
photograph of a well-known football player on its boxes without obtaining the player's
permission. Generally speaking, recognizing an additional tort duty is relatively communalist,
because it increases the responsibility of the defendant (in this case, the cereal company) for
the injury inflicted on the plaintiff. Such injuries, we might assume, would consist in shame
and personal embarrassment, as well as diversion of income that the plaintiff might have
generated had he been able to control the right to his publicity. Moreover, because recognizing
the cause of action would interfere with the company's ability to compete in the free market,
the individualist position clearly would be against recognizing the cause of action.
Yet, from the cereal company's perspective, refusing to recognize the tort also might be seen
as communalist, because it would serve to make the football player more responsible for the
consequences of his actions against the poor beleaguered cereal company. If the football
player could enjoin the use of his name or likeness without his permission, his refusal to deal
with the cereal company might cost them thousands of dollars in profits. Thus, from the
company's perspective, granting the football player a property right in his name or likeness is
highly individualist, while protecting the security of its profits and good will is relatively
communalist.
38 Note that Kennedy's original distinction has this same symmetrical indeterminacy.
Using the example in the preceding footnote, recognition of the tort of commercial
appropriation of name or likeness might seem relatively altruist, if we think that the company
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Normally when one introduces a distinction, one is quite devoted to
preserving its existence as a distinction and resists attempts to show
that the distinction is manipulable, or that from different perspectives
the distinction leads to opposite conclusions. Here, however, I have
constructed a distinction between individualism and communalism
only to deconstruct it a few paragraphs later, and nevertheless I shall
continue to use it as the basis for the entire analysis contained in this
Article. Naturally, I feel compelled to explain this somewhat unor-
thodox approach.
The distinction between individualism and communalism is equivo-
cal in theory, yet it provides concrete expectations in practice. Once
the distinction is explained, most people in fact do believe that strict
products liability is more communalist than a negligence standard-
that is, it makes the injurers (the manufacturers) more responsible for
the effects of their behavior on the injured parties (the consumers).
Why one believes this given the theoretical manipulability of the con-
cepts of injury and responsibility is precisely what is most interesting;
it is central to the argument presented in this Article.
Terms like "responsibility" or "injury" require a context in which
to be understood and used. To the extent that we can vary this con-
text, or rather our description of this context, we can vary the mean-
ing of these terms. Indeed, I would go further and argue that without
a grounding in a particular set of social assumptions, legal concepts
like "responsibility," "harm," and "injury" threaten to become
empty. By varying our assumptions we can produce radically differ-
ent conclusions about who is harming whom, what is the relevant
injury, and who is ultimately responsible for the injury.39 If one
accepts the force of this critique, the not too surprising conclusion is-
that individualism and communalism are really mirror images of each
should have to forbear from injuring the player's emotional tranquility and property rights
without compensation. Yet from another perspective, we could view nonrecognition of the
tort as altruist if we think that the player should be required to share the profits accruing from
his name or likeness with the less fortunate company through the equivalent of a compulsory
license.
39 These claims are hardly as radical as they might at first appear. They are corroborated
by two of the most orthodox positions in modem legal discourse: Hohfeld's analysis of legal
concepts, and the reciprocity of causation and harm first noted by Coase and Calabresi, which
is central to the modem law and economics movement. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961); Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960); Hohfeld, supra note 28.
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other. Communalism emphasizes the responsibility of the injurer and
deemphasizes the responsibility of the victim, while individualism
takes precisely the opposite strategy. Because from different perspec-
tives one can be either the injurer or the victim, individualist and
communalist arguments turn out to be the same arguments with the
parties reversed. This analytical indeterminacy as to who is the
injurer and who is the victim is the source of the underlying symme-
try between individualism and communalism.
In most cases, however, people more or less agree on who the
injured party is. Here it makes sense to speak of the relatively individ-
ualist or communalist position because of an existing consensus about
the identity of the injury and the victim. Nevertheless, one still can
redescribe and recontextualize the situation to shift responsibility for
the injury from one party to the other. One can attempt to shift
responsibility onto the victim (individualism), or onto the alleged
injurer (communalism). Even where there is no disagreement about
which position is individualist and which is communalist, we will dis-
cover that the individualist and communalist strategies for shifting
responsibility remain mirror images.
We are now equipped to understand the key move in developing a
semiotics of responsibility-a move that synthesizes the previous
work of Professors Kennedy and Kelman. The basic idea is this:
Interpretive constructions of facts are systematically connected to
individualist or communalist arguments about responsibility. In
other words, there is an important relationship between the modes of
factual characterization first identified by Kelman and the substantive
orientations of discourse first identified by Kennedy.
The rest of this Article develops this basic insight by demonstrating
how characterizations of act, intention, causation, free will, and avail-
able options can be made in an individualist or communalist manner.
These debates appear in many different areas of legal doctrine and cut
across the traditional legal distinctions of questions of fact, questions
of law, and mixed questions of fact and law; they are implicated in
doctrinal questions that might be classified under any of these catego-
ries. Although most of the examples of individualist and communal-
ist characterization are taken from tort and criminal law, one easily
could extend the analysis to other areas of law. This study of factual
and legal arguments will reveal that just as the individualist and com-
munalist positions are mirror images of each other, the individualist
1990]
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and communalist methods of factual characterization are really trans-
formations of each other. Moreover, as the various forms of factual
depictions of responsibility are demonstrated, the connections
between ideology and responsibility will become increasingly clear.
II. DESCRIBING EVENTS RELEVANT TO DETERMINATIONS
OF RESPONSIBILITY
A. Broad versus Narrow or Abstract versus Concrete
Descriptions of Events
1. Broad versus Narrow Descriptions of Probability
of Causal Connection
A simple example of contrasting styles of argument arises in situa-
tions of causal uncertainty. Where the causal connection between the
defendant's behavior and the plaintiff's harm is at issue, the parties
can emphasize or deemphasize legal responsibility simply by
recharacterizing causal probabilities. The well known tort cases of
New York Central Railroad Co. v. Grimstad,40 and Kirincich v. Stand-
ard Dredging Co.41 offer excellent examples of this technique. 42 Grim-
stad arose under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The plaintiff's
decedent, the captain of a barge, fell off the barge into the water and
subsequently drowned. The plaintiff sued the owner of the barge for
negligently failing to equip the barge with life preservers, life buoys,
and other lifesaving equipment. The plaintiff argued that but for the
negligence, the captain would not have drowned. The court of
appeals held that the defendant should have been granted a directed
verdict on the issue of causation:
40 264 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1920).
41 112 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1940).
42 Like Kelman, I have taken most of the cases to be discussed from standard law school
casebooks. S. Kadish, S. Schulhofer & M. Paulsen, Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases
and Materials (4th ed. 1983); R. Epstein, C. Gregory & H. Kalven, Cases and Materials on
Torts (4th ed. 1984); see Kelman, supra note 3, at 593. My reasons for doing this are quite
simple-it is much easier to find representative examples this way. Moreover, because
casebook editors are not particularly interested in making the points about rhetoric and
ideology that interest me here, there is no reason to believe that the sample of cases is
unrepresentative. To be sure, casebooks often include opinions precisely because the judges in
these cases have made especially thorough or well-done arguments for the positions they
adopt. In this sense, then, there is a clear sample bias. It is not, however, a bias that affects my
argument that certain general forms of rhetorical characterization are associated with
particular positions about responsibility.
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Obviously the proximate cause of the decedent's death was his fall-
ing into the water, and in the absence of any testimony whatever on
the point, we will assume that this happened without negligence on
his part or on the part of the defendant. On the... question [of],
whether a life buoy would have saved the decedent from drowning,
we think the jury were left to pure conjecture and speculation....
[T]here is nothing whatever to show that the decedent was not
drowned because he did not know how to swim, nor anything to show
that, if there had been a life buoy on board, the decedent's wife would
have got it in time ... or, if she had, that she would have thrown it so
that her husband could have seized it, or, if she did, that he would
have seized it, or that, if he did, it would have prevented him from
drowning.
43
The court in Grimstad is making an individualist argument that
there should be no liability without causation." Thus, it character-
izes the defendant's causal responsibility as narrowly as possible. The
court downplays the possible causal connection between having a life
buoy on board ship and saving the captain's life. Dozens of unknown
circumstances and intervening events might have prevented a success-
ful rescue.
The court argues that in the face of causal uncertainty, and in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, we may not assume that the
absence of a life buoy caused the captain's death. Of course, if there
was truly no evidence on the point, we might ask why we should not
presume that the decedent's wife would have gotten to the buoy in
time and would have thrown it correctly (since she had every incen-
tive to do so), and that the decedent would have succeeded in grab-
bing and holding onto it (since, once again, he had every reason to
try). In other words, why should we not assume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that people will act to maximize their (or
their loved ones') chances of survival?
Indeed, this very sort of approach is taken in Kirincich v. Standard
Dredging Co.45 In Kirincich, the deceased fell off a dredge near the
shoreline and was swept away by the tide. His shipmates tried to save
him by throwing heaving lines, but they did not throw a life pre-
43 Grimstad, 264 F. at 335.
44 See Balkin, supra note 17, at 78.
45 112 F.2d 163.
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server. 46 The court of appeals reversed a directed verdict for defend-
ant on the issue of causation. Its argument is communalist; the
defendant was at fault, and the plaintiff deserves recovery:
[W]ould Kirincich have drowned even if a larger and more buoyant
object than the inch heaving line had been thrown within two feet of
him? If he could swim, even badly, there would be no doubt. Assum-
ing he could not, we think he might... have saved himself through
the help of something which he could more easily grasp. We can take
judicial notice of the instinct of self-preservation that at first compen-
sates for lack of skill. A drowning man comes to the surface and
clutches at what he finds there-hence the significance of size and
buoyancy in life saving apparatus.47
It is a favorite project of torts professors to set their students the
task of distinguishing and reconciling cases like Grimstad and
Kirincich, and I do not want to suggest that the cases are irreconcila-
ble, even though they do seem to point in opposite directions.48 My
46 Id. at 163-64.
47 Id. at 164. The court specifically took issue with the result in Grimstad:
In other words, we prefer the doctrine of Judge Learned Hand in the case of Zinnel v.
United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 2 Cir., 10 F.2d 47, 49: "There of
course remains the question whether they might have also said that the fault caused the
loss. About that we agree no certain conclusion was possible. Nobody could, in the
nature of things, be sure that the intestate would have seized the rope, or, if he had not,
that it would have stopped his body. But we are not dealing with a criminal case, nor
are we justified, where certainty is impossible, in insisting upon it .... [W]e think it a
question about which reasonable men might at least differ whether the intestate would
not have been saved, had it been there." [We prefer Judge Hand's reasoning] to that of
his colleague, Judge Hough, dissenting in that case, and concurring in the earlier case of
New York Central R. Co. v. Grimstad, 2 Cir., 264 F. 334, 335.
Id.
48 For example, Landes and Posner give a perfectly reasonable reconciliation based on
efficiency analysis in their book on the economics of tort law:
[T]he probability that Grimstad would have drowned if there was no life buoy on board
[was not much greater than] the corresponding probability if there was one ....
Kirincich had actually reached for the line that his shipmates had tossed to him,
and the court thought that if the object had been larger and more buoyant he would
have been able to grasp and hold on to it. The difference between the two cases is not
that Grimstad would have died even if the defendant in that case had taken care and
Kirincich would have been saved, but that there was a much greater probability that
care would have been effective in Kirincich's case than in Grimstad's.
W. Landes & R. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 240-41 (1987). Of course, this
analysis involves its own manipulation of causal probabilities-the bare assertion that having a
life buoy on board would not greatly increase Grimstad's chances of survival is not at all
obvious. In defense of the result in Kirincich, Landes and Posner point out that the decedent
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concern here, however, is not how the cases may be distinguished, but
the ways in which the judges in each case characterized the facts
before them-for it is often such characterizations that make distinc-
tions possible.49
The court's statements in Grimstad and Kirincich are statements
about facts made in the presence of uncertainty. The uncertainty in
Grimstad is one that necessarily attends any counterfactual specula-
tion-what would have happened if there had been a life buoy aboard
the ship? Uncertainty also can be caused by a gap in the record as to
what actually happened. In either case, because of the presence of
uncertainty, a judge or a lawyer can characterize facts to accentuate
or downplay the degree of causal connection between the defendant's
behavior and the plaintiff's injury. In Grimstad, the court adopts
what I will term a narrow view of the defendant's causal responsibil-
ity: Where there is more than one way to characterize a fact or to
estimate a probability of causal connection, the court chooses the
characterization that reduces responsibility and estimates the
probability as low rather than high. The court in Kirincich, on the
other hand, adopts what I will term a broad view of defendant's
causal responsibility: The court chooses the characterization that
increases responsibility, and estimates the probabilities as great that
even a person who could not swim would have sufficient instincts to
survive by clinging to proper lifesaving equipment. A narrow charac-
terization of the defendant's responsibility for the plaintiff's harm is
more likely to be helpful in an individualist argument against liability;
similarly, a broad characterization is natural in a communalist
argument.
The court in Grimstad uses a distinctive rhetorical device to make
the causal connection appear more tenuous-it multiplies the possible
circumstances that could have prevented a successful rescue. It is as
almost caught the line thrown to him, but that is only because the defendant in that case
already had some lifesaving equipment on board. Thus the decedent's chances in Grimstad
might also have been increased greatly if some life preserving equipment had been aboard the
barge.
49 Judge Clark's opinion in Kirincich is quite candid on this point:
We think it fair to say that the resolvement of the case at bar depends upon the
judicial stigmatism of the court deciding it.... Our appraisal happens to differ with
[the lower court's] and we find the same difference elsewhere in the "books". It is an
application of facts to a point of view.
112 F.2d at 163.
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if the court (rhetorically) places as many obstacles in the decedent's
way as possible, in order to prove that he would not have survived.
The court in Kirincich takes precisely the opposite tack, omitting ref-
erences to other possible interferences and placing the rhetorical focus
on the very moment in which the decedent grasped for the life line.
The court in Grimstad uses a second, related rhetorical device: It
creates a disjointed perspective of events, thus metaphorically separat-
ing and distancing the defendant's acts from the decedent's death.
The court's rhetoric identifies so many possible breaks in the causal
chain that the defendant's fault appears remote and unconnected to
the decedent's harm. Conversely, the court's rhetoric in Kirincich
collapses the many possibilities into a single, exigent event: "A
drowning man comes to the surface and clutches at what he finds
there."' 50 This depiction emphasizes the (temporal) closeness and
unity of the events, and the immediacy of the fault to the harm. It is
important to understand that neither court is simply describing the
world; both are remaking it through rhetoric. Moreover, their tech-
niques are simply mirror images of each other.
A second example of broad and narrow characterizations involves
two slip and fall cases, McInturff v. Chicago Title and Trust5 and
Reynolds v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. 2 In Mclnturff, the decedent
was found dead at the bottom of defendant's stairway. The plaintiff
presented evidence that the stairs were worn down in violation of a
city ordinance, and that there was no railing on the right-hand side of
the stairwell. On appeal, the court overturned a jury verdict for the
plaintiff. Its argument is individualist, denying causal and therefore
legal responsibility:
The fragmentary evidence on the issue of the defendants' negli-
gence did not establish any relationship between the alleged negli-
gence and the proximate cause of the decedent's fall and injury.
There was no direct evidence relative to what took place prior to and
at the time of the decedent's injury. There was no proof that the
condition of the stairway, or the alleged failure to comply with the
handrail ordinances, caused the injury or damage suffered by the
plaintiff.... Damages cannot be assessed on mere surmise or conjec-
ture as to what probably happened to cause [decedent's] injury and
50 Id. at 164.
51 102 Il1. App. 2d 39, 243 N.E.2d 657 (1968).
52 37 La. Ann. 694 (1885).
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death.5
3
In Reynolds, the plaintiff, a 250-pound woman, hurriedly leaving a
lighted waiting room, slipped and fell down unlighted steps leading to
a train platform. The defendant argued that the plaintiff might have
fallen even if it were broad daylight, but the appellate court affirmed a
judgment for the plaintiff. Its argument is clearly communalist-
defendant was at fault and therefore should pay:
We concede that [defendant's characterization of events] is possible,
and recognize the distinction between post hoc and propter hoc. But
where the negligence of the defendant greatly multiplies the chances
of accident to the plaintiff, and is of a character naturally leading to
its occurrence, the mere possibility that it might have happened with-
out the negligence is not sufficient to break the chain of cause and
effect between the negligence and the injury. Courts, in such matters,
consider the natural and ordinary course of events, and do not
indulge in fanclful [sic] suppositions.54
Again, it may be possible to distinguish the two cases. 5  What is
more important for our purposes, however, is that the same broad and
narrow characterizations of the defendant's responsibility are present:
broad, and thus communalist, in Reynolds; narrow, and thus individu-
alist, in McInturff.
It is tempting to think that the judges use these characterizations in
these cases because the facts really do point to a greater degree of
causal connection in Kirincich and Reynolds than in Grimstad and
McInturff; all the judges are doing is adding a little rhetorical flourish
to an already correct assessment of probabilities. It may be the other
way around, however-the cases may seem to come out right because
of the way in which the facts are characterized. For example, we
53 102 Ill. App. 2d at 49, 243 N.E.2d at 662.
54 37 La. Ann. at 698.
55 For example, in Reynolds, but not in Mclnturff, the plaintiff was available to testify that
the darkness of the stairway did cause her to fall, and to deny personally that her injury was
due to other factors. Of course, this attempted distinction cuts both ways, since the only
reason that the plaintiff was able to testify in Reynolds is because she was not killed in the fall.
A better ground of distinction is that, in Mclnturff, there was evidence that the decedent used
the stairway daily and was aware of its condition. 102 Ill. App. 2d at 48-49, 243 N.E.2d at
662. Nevertheless, these extra facts still would not appear sufficient to establish that only an




could adopt a narrow view of causation in Kirincich and Reynolds and
a broad view in Grimstad and Mclnturff:
Narrow view of defendant's causal responsibility (individualist)
Kirincich: Plaintiff's decedent perished because he fell into the water
and drowned; there is no evidence that defendant's violation of safety
rules made any difference. Plaintiff's decedent might have drowned
because he was unable to swim. Even if he could swim, the presence
of additional lifesaving equipment does not guarantee that the crew
would have been any more successful in getting a different line or a
life buoy to the plaintiff. Indeed, it might have resulted in the line or,
the buoy landing further away from the drowning man. Even if the
plaintiff had been able to swim, and had been able to grasp what was
thrown him, there is no evidence that he would have had the strength
to hold on until he could be pulled to safety.
Reynolds: There is no proof that plaintiff fell because the stairway
was lit poorly. Plaintiff could have tripped, stumbled when her shoe
broke, or been clumsy or drunk; there are literally hundreds of possi-
ble causes. Self-serving testimony by the plaintiff does not make poor
lighting a more probable explanation than any other. Since the actual
cause of the fall is mere speculation we should not send this case to
the jury.
Broad view of defendant's causal responsibility (communalist)
Grimstad: Of course we cannot know for certain that the captain
could have grasped the buoy if it had been thrown to him, yet the
presence of the buoy certainly would have helped at the moment
when the drowning man grasped for any available form of assistance.
The result is uncertain, but where certainty is impossible we cannot
insist on it. In any case, we never can know how well the wife would
have thrown the buoy precisely because there was no buoy to throw
due to the defendant's negligence. Nevertheless, given the decedent's
profession, his will to survive, and the fact that it was his wife who
was trying to save him, the probabilities are very good that throwing
the decedent a buoy might have made the difference.
Mclnturff: Although there is no absolute proof of why the decedent
was killed, we have enough of an idea of what happened to send this
case to the jury. Where the negligence (worn staircases and no rail-
ing) greatly multiplies the chances of an accident, and is of a charac-
ter naturally leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that an
accident might have occurred another way should not be enough to
keep the case from the jury. The fact that the decedent is not here to
testify as to the cause of his fall itself may be due to the defendant's
negligence.
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The famous case of Regina v. Dudley & Stephens5 6 involves another
example of characterization in the face of uncertainty, although here
the problem concerns whether there is a causal connection that excul-
pates the defendants. Hence, the individualist perspective views
causal probabilities broadly while the communalist perspective views
them narrowly. The defendants were abandoned on a small lifeboat
without water or food. Not knowing when, if ever, they would be
saved, they killed a boy who was already near death from starvation
and ate his body to survive. As the court characterized the facts, the
defendants could not avail themselves of the defense of necessity (a
choice between the lesser of two evils) because:
[T]he prisoners put to death a weak and unoffending boy upon the
chance of preserving their own lives... with the certainty of depriv-
ing him of any possible chance of survival. The verdict finds in terms
that "if the men had not fed upon the body of the boy they would
probably not have survived," and that "the boy being in a much
weaker condition was likely to have died before them." They might
possibly have been picked up next day by a passing ship; they might
possibly not have been picked up at all; in either case it is obvious that
the killing of the boy would have been an unnecessary and profitless
act.
57
The communalist position, taken by the court, downplays the possi-
bility of a causal connection that exculpates the defendant. In the
face of uncertainty, the court emphasizes the small probability that
the defendants' act would have made a difference in preserving their
lives, and the great probability (indeed, the certainty) that their act
would end the boy's life. Thus, the court argues, the defendants in
fact did not choose the lesser of two evils. Moreover, the court
emphasizes the presence of available alternatives (a ship might arrive
at any time) and (simultaneously) the possible futility of improving
the situation (a ship might never arrive).
For each of these arguments there is a symmetrical individualist
rejoinder. The defense would emphasize the probability that defend-
ants were justified in acting as they did, which we might call the
probability of "exculpatory causation": The actual choice made in
the face of uncertainty "was between ... the lad's very slight chance
56 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
57 Id. at 279.
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of survival and.., the increase in the already greater chances of sur-
vival of the men."'58 Characterized as a comparison between marginal
increases in probability, the defendants did choose the lesser of two
evils and thus were entitled to the defense of necessity. 9
As to the 4possibility of available alternatives, the defense would
argue that time was running out for the starving men. The defendants
had to act quickly and only one course of action was immediately
available to them. The court should not require them to risk their
lives on idle speculation about the possibility of being discovered by
accident as they wasted away in a vast ocean, more than 1,000 miles
from land. Finally, despite the possibility that they would never be
found, killing the boy was necessary because it was the most likely to
result in someone's survival; the defendants surely would have died
more quickly if they had not devoured the boy's body.
We can summarize the rhetorical devises described above in the
following chart:









58 Glazebrook, The Necessity Plea in English Criminal Law, 30 Cambridge. L.J. 87, 114
(1972).
59 I do not mean to suggest by this example that individualism regularly looks to marginal,
and communalism to gross, probabilities. The point is that here the individualist
characterization chooses to focus on marginal increases in probability because that perspective
most justifies the defendants' actions and deemphasizes their moral and legal responsibility. In
a case like Kirincich or Grimstad, the communalist argument might be that the victim's
chances of survival, however slight in absolute terms, would have been greatly increased if the
defendant's ship had proper life saving equipment, and that this equipment could have been
provided at comparatively little cost to the defendant. In Kirincich or Grimstad an
individualist characterization of the facts might stress the absolute probability of survival if
that were comparatively small.
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2. Concrete and Abstract Descriptions-Foreseeability of Harm
It has long been understood that lawyers can manipulate the fore-
seeability test of proximate causation to make the plaintiff's injury
appear either as a foreseeable or an unforeseeable consequence of
defendant's negligent act. What is less well known is that there are
relatively mechanical ways of doing this, each of which reflect individ-
ualist and communalist forms of argument. Since foreseeability is a
predicate for liability, we should expect arguments for defendant's
responsibility based on the foreseeability of plaintiff's injury to be
communalist and arguments against foreseeability to be individualist.
United Novelty Co. v. Daniels, the case involving the peripatetic rat
discussed at the beginning of this Article, is an excellent example of
how these techniques are used in practice. The defendant in that case
surely would have argued that nothing is more unforeseeable than a
rat jumping out of a coin-operated machine, hurling itself into an
open flame, and then running back toward the machine at exactly the
spot necessary to ignite gas vapors in the room and cause an explo-
sion. Because foreseeability, or scope of the risk, is the general test of
proximate causation in negligence law, the rhetorical move that
defeats causation is specificity. The more specifically a situation is
described, the more unforeseeable it is that the precise chain of events
would have occurred.
The plaintiff's response, which the Daniels court accepts, charac-
terizes the situation abstractly, in terms of a general type of harm that
was clearly foreseeable. Thus, it is foreseeable that in placing an open
flame in a room where gas vapors are leaking, there is the danger of
an explosion, regardless of the exact instrumentality that causes the
explosion. Obviously, abstracting from particular events and instead
focusing on general categories of harm make an accident look more
foreseeable than it otherwise might seem. The manipulability of the
foreseeability standard, in other words, is based on the ability of lan-
guage to categorize events in increasingly more (or less) general and
abstract terms.
Tuttle v. Atlantic City Railroad Co. 60 and Mauney v. Gulf Refining
Co. 61 involve the foreseeability of a plaintiff's frightened response to a
defendant's negligence. In Tuttle, one of defendant railroad's cars
60 66 N.J.L. 327, 49 A. 450 (1901).
61 193 Miss. 421, 9 So. 2d 780 (1942).
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derailed, "dashed" across an adjacent street, and struck a house.62
Mrs. Tuttle was on a nearby sidewalk, and in an effort to reach a place
of safety, she fell and injured her knee. In fact, she would have been
in no danger if she simply had stayed where she was. The court
rejected defendant's claim that Mrs. Tuttle's own acts, and not the
negligence of the railroad, proximately caused her harm:
[Mrs. Tuttle] was placed in peril by the negligent act of the defendant,
and in her effort to escape from danger she fell, and was injured.
Does it require any stretch of imagination to believe that everyone in
the neighborhood of this derailed car was frightened? And it would
be extraordinary, indeed, if they attempted to escape, and were
injured, that they should be without remedy.63
The court's technique is to characterize broadly the sorts of things
a person would imagine happening: When you create a disturbance, it
is foreseeable that people will be frightened and want to get out of the
way. The court does not dwell on the foreseeability of the plaintiff's
particular acts, but on acts of the same general nature.
In Mauney, the defendants negligently started a fire that spread to a
filling station and a tank car full of gasoline. Bystanders rushed from
the scene, shouting that the tank truck and the filling station were
about to explode. Hearing this, the plaintiff, who was about fifty feet
away in a cafe operated by her husband and herself, picked up their
two-year-old child and began to run away. She tripped over a chair
and suffered a miscarriage. In this case, the court denied that the
injury to plaintiff was foreseeable:
If appellant didn't see a chair in her way in her own place of business,
it would impose an inadmissible burden upon appellees to say that
they should have foreseen from across the street and through the
walls of a building on another comer what appellant didn't see right
at her feet and in an immediate situation entirely familiar to her. Sup-
pose she had run to the sidewalk and thence against a lamp post, or
into the street and against a parked automobile. Or suppose she had
run into a pedestrian, injuring him. These remote eventualities could
be multiplied almost without number.
64
62 66 N.J.L. at 328, 49 A. at 450.
63 Id. at 331-32, 49 A. at 451.
64 193 Miss. at 431, 9 So. 2d at 782.
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Here the court uses a narrow characterization of foreseeability, focus-
ing on the plaintiff's specific acts: It was unforeseeable that there
would be a chair in a particular place, that the plaintiff would not see
it, and so forth. The more specifically a court details the actual chain
of causation, the more improbable it appears that the defendant could
have foreseen what happened to the plaintiff. Just as Grimstad uses
the multiplication of intervening events to make causal connection
appear remote, so the court in Mauney uses particular description to
create a rhetorical effect of distance or remoteness in terms of
foreseeability.
Note, however, that just as in Kirincich and Grimstad, the opinions
in Mauney and Tuttle, rather than neutrally describing events,
actively apply rhetorical devices to events; they provide us with repre-
sentations of causality rather than causality itself. If we want to argue
the other side of each case, we could reverse the characterizations by
applying the opposite rhetorical devices. We could have a narrow
characterization of foreseeability in Tuttle and a broad one in
Mauney:
Tuttle: It was unforeseeable when the railroad car jumped its
tracks that the plaintiff would run from a safe place to a more danger-
ous one, stumble over the specific object she did, fall, and injure her
knee.
Mauney: It is foreseeable that if you negligently create a risk of a
big explosion, people will run away from it as quickly as they can and,
in their haste, will injure themselves.65
65 One of the most remarkable examples of using abstract and concrete descriptions to
manipulate the doctrine of foreseeability appears in In re Guardian Casualty Co., 253 A.D.
360, 2 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1938). In that case, an automobile and a taxicab collided due to both
drivers' negligence. The taxicab was forced across a sidewalk and hit a stone building,
imbedding itself in the stoop. A police officer and several other persons began to remove the
car from the building. About half an hour after the accident, the decedent, who ran a laundry
in the building, came out to inspect her store. She was struck and killed by falling stones that
had been loosened by the impact of the car with the wall. The individualist argument against
liability is that it was totally unforeseeable when the drivers acted negligently that one of the
cars would crash into a wall loosening particular stones in a particular building that would
pose a safety hazard for pedestrians some half hour later. Nevertheless, the court held that the
two drivers' negligence proximately caused the decedent's death. The court's communalist
argument for liability uses abstract descriptions and broad characterizations of foreseeability:
The [drivers of the two cars], whose wrongful acts caused a vehicle to be projected
across a sidewalk and against a building, with such force as to loosen parts of the
structure, must have foreseen the necessity of removal of the vehicle from the sidewalk.
They might reasonably have anticipated that the parts of the structure which were
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Similar considerations apply in substantive criminal law. In People
v. Arzon, 66 the defendant started a fire on the fifth floor of an aban-
doned building. Firemen arrived and entered the building to put out
the flames, but made no progress. After deciding to leave the build-
ing, they suddenly were "enveloped by a dense smoke, which was
later discovered to have arisen from another independent fire that had
broken out on the second floor. Although this fire was also deter-
mined to have originated in arson, there [was] virtually no evidence
implicating the defendant in its responsibility."67 The combination of
the smoke from this second-floor fire and the existence of the defend-
ant's fifth-floor fire made evacuation dangerous, and one of the fire-
men died as a result of injuries sustained while trying to escape. The
defendant argued that regardless of his reckless conduct, he could not
be convicted of second-degree murder because his act of arson did not
cause the death of the fireman. The court disagreed:
Certainly, it was foreseeable that firemen would respond to the situa-
tion, thus exposing them, along with the persons already present in
the vicinity, to a life-threatening danger. The [defendant's] fire...
continued to burn out of control, greatly adding to the problem of
evacuating the building by blocking off one of the access routes. At
the very least, the defendant's act, as was the case in [People v. ] Kibbe,
[35 N.Y.2d 407, 321 N.E.2d 773 (1974),] placed the deceased in a
position where he was particularly vulnerable to the separate and
independent force, in this instance, the fire on the second floor.
68
dislodged by the blow would fall into the highway. That a passing pedestrian might be
injured when such an event took place in a city street, was also foreseeable. It would
seem plain that although the injury to the pedestrian did not occur for some minutes
after the application of the original force, because of the circumstances that the
dislodged stones were temporarily held in place by the vehicle, this would not alter the
case, when there is nothing to show the application of a new force causing the stone to
fall.
Id. at 362-63, 2 N.Y.S.2d at 234. Phrased even more generally, it is foreseeable when you drive
negligently that you may damage other people's property in such a way as to cause it to
become unsafe.
66 92 Misc. 2d 739, 401 N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
67 Id. at 740, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
68 Id. at 743, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 159. In the Kibbe case to which the court refers, the
defendants abandoned their helplessly intoxicated robbery victim by the side of a dark road in
subfreezing temperature, partially undressed and without his eyeglasses, one-half mile from the
nearest structure; the victim was killed by a passing truck. The court upheld the defendants'
convictions for murder. People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407, 410-11, 321 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1974).
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The communalist arguments in Arzon involve a broad view of fore-
seeability. Instead of focusing on the precise method by which the
victim died, they characterize the danger to the victim in general
terms, such as increased probability of harm. In particular, note the
highly abstract language used in Arzon: The fire "placed the deceased
in a position where he was particularly vulnerable to the separate and
independent force";6 9 it was foreseeable that setting the fire would
"expos[e] [the firemen] . .. to a life-threatening danger."70
By contrast, People v. Stewart,71 discussed and distinguished in
Arzon, takes a narrow view of foreseeability. In Stewart, the defend-
ant stabbed the victim with a knife. The victim was brought to a
hospital where a surgeon operated to save his life. While the victim
was still on the operating table, the surgeon performed an unrelated
hernia operation that caused the victim to die. The court's argument
for dismissing the homicide charge is individualist: The defendant was
not causally responsible, because the patient would have survived if
the surgeon had not performed the hernia operation. Here the court
deemphasizes the causal connection by focusing on the specific cir-
cumstances through which the harm occurred: It is not foreseeable
that stabbing someone would lead to their eventual death in a hernia
operation.72
Stewart certainly looks like a less convincing case than Arzon.
Note, however, that we could adopt a broad view of foreseeability in
Stewart simply by describing the facts more abstractly: It is certainly
foreseeable that stabbing someone would send them to the hospital
and would subject them to risk of dying in the process of medical
treatment, either because of subsequent negligence by the surgeon or
collateral procedures like the application of anesthesia, movement to
and from the operating room, etc. Could we not say, as in Arzon, that
stabbing the victim required him to undergo surgery, and thus
"placed the deceased in a position where he was particularly vulnera-
ble to the separate and independent force" 73 of the surgeon? After all,
69 92 Misc. 2d at 743, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
70 Id. Similarly in Kibbe, one can argue that stranding an inebriated victim increases the
chances that he or she will be injured in some way or another-if not by overexposure, then by
attempting to flag down a fast moving truck. See Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d at 411, 321 N.E.2d at 776.
71 40 N.Y.2d 692, 358 N.E.2d 487, 389 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1976).
72 40 N.Y.2d at 698, 358 N.E.2d at 492, 389 N.Y.S.2d 808.
73 Arzon, 92 Misc. 2d at 743, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
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once the stabbing victim was in the operating room, it is certainly
foreseeable that the surgeon might try to fix whatever other problems
she observed while the patient was under anesthesia.
Similarly, we could adopt a narrow view of foreseeabiity in Arzon.
We could say what the court in Arzon said to distinguish Stewart:
"the possibility that death resulted from a factor not attributable to
the defendant could not be ruled out beyond a reasonable doubt, since
the [victim] would, in all likelihood, have survived except for"'74 the
second fire that blocked his path. Moreover, if we describe the risk
created by the defendants in Arzon narrowly and precisely, as the
court did in Stewart, the victim's death begins to look much less fore-
seeable. From the defendant's standpoint, it is hardly foreseeable that
setting a fire creates an unreasonable risk of a fireman dying from a
wholly independent fire that the defendant knew nothing about.
To sum up, a broad view of foreseeability normally involves a gen-
eral and abstract description of events, while a narrow view generally
involves a particularized and concrete description of events.75 In all
of the above examples, the individualist position describes the situa-
tion concretely, and the communalist position describes the situation
abstractly. Nevertheless, there is no necessary connection between
individualism and concrete descriptions or communalism and abstract
descriptions. The courts adopt these forms of characterization in
these cases because the primary issue is the defendant's responsibility;
where the plaintiff's responsibility is at issue, the alliances are com-
pletely reversed. Thus, to return to United Novelty Co. v. Daniels, the
defendant surely would claim that the plaintiff's decedent was con-
tributorily negligent. But this claim requires an argument that the
decedent engaged in conduct that a reasonable person would have
foreseen to be dangerous. And in explaining why the decedent's con-
duct was unreasonable, the defendant must, either implicitly or
explicitly, argue that it is foreseeable that cleaning the coin machine
with gasoline in a room heated by an open flame might cause an
74 Id. at 741, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
75 One cal describe in abstract or concrete terms the type of risk created (for example, in
Kibbe, whether the risk is "being placed in a precarious situation" or "exposure to freezing
conditions"), the type of harm foreseeable (for example, in Stewart, whether the harm foreseen
is "death" or "death from a stab wound"), and finally, the class of persons foreseen as affected
(for example, in In re Guardian Casualty, whether the risk of harm was to "persons near the
crash site" or to "pedestrians walking by a car thirty minutes after it crashed into a wall").
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explosion. Thus, the defendant's (individualist) argument for contrib-
utory negligence abstractly describes events to accentuate the dece-
dent's responsibility for his own situation. Conversely, the plaintiff
would rebut the claim of the decedent's possible contributory negli-
gence by arguing that if the movements of a solitary rat were unfore-
seeable from the defendant's standpoint, they were equally
unforeseeable for the decedent. Thus, the plaintiff's (communalist)
argument against contributory negligence narrowly and concretely
characterizes events to minimize decedent's responsibility. Once
again, it is the symmetries of characterization (that is, the relations of
difference between the two sides) and not the precise alliances that are
the key to understanding the semiotic character of the arguments:
DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS FOR PURPOSES OF FORESEEABILITY
Individualist Communalist
Caused by defendant Concrete Abstract
Caused by plaintiff Abstract Concrete
Figure 2
B. Time Framing as a Means of Emphasizing Inculpatory and
Exculpatory Facts
Varying the relevant time period in which facts are to be considered
is a frequently used device for characterizing the responsibility of the
parties. Professor Kelman first demonstrated this point in the context
of criminal law,76 and my analysis in this Section will draw on his
work in several important respects. Kelman showed how alterna-
tively viewing events from a broad or narrow time frame, or from a
unified or disjointed perspective, enables courts to justify particular
conclusions about criminal responsibility.7 The examples that follow
demonstrate the use of these techniques as well as a third, related
device: broad versus narrow contextualization.
76 Kelman, supra note 3, at 592-93.
77 Id. at 593-96.
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L Expansion and Contraction of Time Frames-The Example of
Act and Omission
Moral and legal responsibility often depends on whether a person
has acted or merely omitted to act. For example, this distinction is
important in tort law because in many circumstances there is no
affirmative duty to rescue a stranger, although one can be held liable
for placing strangers in unreasonably dangerous situations and then
failing to rescue them. In Yania v. Bigan,78 the defendant, Bigan, had
dug an eighteen-foot trench half-filled with water in the course of his
strip mining operations. Bigan invited Yania, a neighboring
stripminer, to visit his property to discuss business. Bigan then
"urged, induced and inveigled" Yania to jump into the water.79
Yania finally did so, and then drowned because he could not get out,
while Bigan stood by and did nothing to assist him. The court
rejected plaintiff's claim that Bigan had a duty to rescue, arguing that
"[t]he complaint does not aver any facts which impose upon Bigan
legal responsibility for placing Yania in the dangerous position in the
water."8 As the court characterizes the situation, Bigan simply stood
at the edge of the trench and did nothing; no matter how morally
culpable he might be, he was not legally responsible.
The court's argument becomes increasingly plausible the more we
focus on Bigan's behavior at the moment Yania leapt in. In doing so
we exclude the previous history that gave rise to this situation: the
invitation and the subsequent tauntings and inducements which, after
all, are verbal acts justly attributable to Bigan. In Kelman's terminol-
ogy, the defendant's counsel and the court have chosen a narrow time
frame in which to view Bigan's behavior.81 The plaintiff, however,
probably would adopt a broad time frame to characterize the situa-
tion. The plaintiff would argue that Bigan's previous behavior consti-
tuted an integral part of an ongoing course of action-taunting plus
failure to rescue-that ultimately resulted in Yania's death.
The defendant's and plaintiff's arguments employ another pair of
opposed rhetorical devices in addition to broad and narrow time
framing. Because in this case choosing a narrow time frame also sepa-
78 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959).
79 Id. at 319, 155 A.2d at 344.
80 Id. at 322, 155 A.2d at 346.
81 Kelman, supra note 3, at 593-94, 600-16, 637-42.
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rates the acts of taunting from the failure to rescue, defendant's strat-
egy is to emphasize a disjointed perspective of events.8 2 Conversely,
the plaintiff's use of a broad time frame implicitly relies on a unified
perspective of events-a continuous course of conduct or a coherent
and interrelated system of action on the part of Bigan, rather than
discrete and isolated instances of Bigan's behavior.8 3
These rhetorical devices are used explicitly by the court in Newton
v. Ellis. 4 In Newton, the defendant dug a hole in a public highway,
which he left unlit at night. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff fell into
the hole while driving and was injured. The individualist argument
against liability would use a narrow time frame and a disjointed per-
spective of events: At the precise moment when the plaintiff fell into
the hole, the defendant was, strictly speaking, not doing anything. It
might have been a good idea for the defendant to have lit the hole, but
just as in Yania v. Bigan, one has no affirmative duty to aid a stranger.
This argument implicitly relies on a perspective that separates the
defendant's previous course of conduct from the events occurring at
the moment of the accident. The court's communalist argument,
however, adopted a broader time frame and a unified perspective of
events. As one of the opinions put it: "This is not a case of not doing:
the defendant does something, omitting to secure protection for the
public. He is not sued for not putting up a light, but for the complex
act."8' 5 Another judge agreed: "Here the cause of action is ... making
the hole, compounded with the not putting up light. When these are
blended, the result is no more than if two positive acts were commit-
82 Id. at 594-95, 616-20.
83 The fact that the act/omission distinction can be manipulated does not mean that Yania
was wrongly decided. Even if one adopts a broad time frame and a unified perspective of
events, one still might argue that it was Yania's own fault that he jumped in the first place. See
Yania, 397 Pa. at 321-23, 155 A.2d at 345-46 (taunting addressed to an adult in full possession
of his mental faculties does not constitute actionable negligence; performance of voluntary
action by decedent was the cause of his unfortunate death). This argument is still clearly
individualist as it stresses the plaintiff/victim's own responsibility for his predicament. The
plaintiff might respond, however, that Bigan had the last clear chance to save Yania. The
defendant might counter that Yania assumed the risk, but under the modem understanding of
this concept, see Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959),
this argument would mean either that Yania was contributorily negligent, in which case the
last clear chance argument would still be available, or that Bigan owed no duty to Yania,
which is the very question at issue here, given that Yania was an invitee on Bigan's premises.
4 5 El. & Bl. 115, 119 Eng. Rep. 424 (1855).
85 Id. at 124, 119 Eng. Rep. at 427-28.
1990]
Virginia Law Review
ted, such as digging the hole and throwing out the dirt: the two would
make up one act."
8 6
2. Inculpatory and Exculpatory Facts-Contributory Negligence
and Self-Defense
From the examples given so far, it is tempting to assume that the
individualist position always seeks a narrow time frame and a dis-
jointed perspective, while the communalist position always seeks a
broad time frame and a unified perspective. The previous examples,
however, only involve the defendant's behavior, where the communal-
ist position stresses responsibility while the individualist position
denies it. Where the plaintiff's responsibility is at issue, the rhetorical
strategies are reversed.
Consider, for example, the possibility of a contributory negligence
defense in Yania v. Bigan. The question whether Yania acted or did
not act probably would not be at issue. Nevertheless, time framing
still would be a useful device for both sides in debating Yania's
responsibility for his own situation. The plaintiff, using a narrow time
frame, would focus on Yania's helplessness at the moment of his
drowning, downplaying as much as possible his ill-considered deci-
sion to jump into the trench at Bigan's urging. Conversely, the
defendant, expanding the time frame, would portray Yania's predica-
ment as the direct result of a foolish course of action, beginning with
his exchanges with Bigan and ending with his voluntary plunge into
the water.
In fact, the relation between time framing techniques and individu
alism and communalism is still more complicated. The key idea
behind these rhetorical strategies is that expanding or contracting the
time frame, or unifying or disjoining factual perspectives, can include
or exclude a number of different facts. Moreover, the facts included
or excluded can assist or hinder either the plaintiff's or the defend-
ant's cause. For purposes of this Article, I shall call facts that assist a
party's position regarding her legal or moral responsibility "exculpa-
tory facts," and facts that hinder a party's position regarding her legal
or moral responsibility "inculpatory facts." An inculpatory fact about
the defendant Bigan would be that before Yania jumped into the
water Bigan spent some time taunting him, or that Bigan had spread a
86 Id. at 124-25, 119 Eng. Rep. at 428.
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rumor around town that Yania was a coward. An exculpatory fact
about the plaintiff's decedent Yania might be that he was a mental
incompetent, or that he had an argument with his wife the night
before and was particularly sensitive to teasing that day.
Individualist arguments emphasize exculpatory facts about the
defendant and inculpatory facts about the victim or third parties not
under the defendant's control; communalist arguments emphasize
inculpatory facts about the defendant and exculpatory facts about the
victim or third parties not under the defendant's control.8 7 It may
seem strange at first to speak of exculpatory and inculpatory facts
about the plaintiff or the victim, but this makes perfect sense given the
symmetry of the individualist and communalist positions. The indi-
vidualist always is trying to shift responsibility from the defendant to
the plaintiff or third parties, while the communalist always is trying to
shift responsibility from the plaintiff and third parties to the defend-
ant. Even in criminal cases in which there is no plaintiff, the defend-
ant's best strategy often is to place the responsibility for the victim's
injury on the victim herself. The well known criminal defense strat-
egy of "placing the victim on trial" can be understood in part as an
attempt to place before the jury as many inculpatory facts about the
victim as possible in the hope of exculpating the defendant."8
A good example of using different time frames in the same argu-
ment occurs in a self-defense case like Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 9 in
which the defendant attempted to justify shooting her husband by
offering testimony that she was a battered wife. In Ibn-Tamas, the
prosecution chose a broad time frame for inculpatory facts about the
defendant, emphasizing the long period of time in which she could
have left her husband. The prosecution also chose a narrow time
87 Two points of clarification are in order. First, the same fact might be inculpatory or
exculpatory depending on how one uses it; for example, consider the possibility that Yania was
drunk when he jumped in. Second, saying that a fact is exculpatory or inculpatory is not the
same as saying that if the fact were true, it would establish the case for or against a party, or
even that it would be legally relevant to the party's claim. For example, under existing
doctrines, Bigan might escape liability even if his prior history of tauntings were revealed, and
the law might not recognize Yania's drunkenness as an excuse. Rather, saying that a fact is
exculpatory with respect to a particular party merely says that it lends moral or legal force to
her claims of lack of responsibility, while an inculpatory fact has precisely the opposite effect.
88 Consistent with this approach, the individualist position concerning social and economic
policy tends to emphasize the victim's own responsibility for her condition. See W. Ryan,
Blaming the Victim (1979).
89 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
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frame to exclude facts tending to exculpate the defendant. For exam-
ple, even though the defendant had been beaten by her husband only a
few minutes earlier, the prosecution emphasized that at the exact
moment she fired the gun, her husband was not beating her but rather
was below her on the staircase.90
In a case like Ibn-Tamas, the prosecution could also manipulate the
time frame to make the victim look more sympathetic. The prosecu-
tion would narrow the time frame to exclude facts tending to incul-
pate the victim. Indeed, what counted, said the prosecution in Ibn-
Tamas, is not whether the victim acted badly over the course of sev-
eral years, but whether at the moment the defendant fired, the victim
was threatening serious bodily harm to her. Conversely, the defense
would choose a broad time frame to emphasize inculpatory facts
about the victim. In Ibn-Tamas, the defense offered testimony con-
cerning increasing physical abuse during the couple's four-year mar-
riage (including beatings of the defendant while she was pregnant
with the couple's second child), the victim's extensive gun and ammu-
nition collection, and his abuse of his previous spouse.91
From this analysis it follows that there is a definite symmetry to the
use of time framing and unification or disjunction of events. The indi-
vidualist strategy will be to:
1. Narrow the time frame and adopt a disjointed perspective of
events to exclude inculpatory facts about the defendant, while adopt-
ing a broad time frame and a unified perspective to include exculpa-
tory facts about the defendant.
2. Broaden the time frame and adopt a unified perspective of
events to include inculpatory facts about the plaintiff/victim, while
adopting a narrow time frame and a disjointed perspective to exclude
exculpatory facts about the plaintiff/victim.
The communalist strategy will be to:
1. Broaden the time frame and adopt a unified perspective of
events to include inculpatory facts about the defendant, while adopt-
ing a narrow time frame and a disjointed perspective to exclude excul-
patory facts about the defendant.
2. Narrow the time frame and adopt a disjointed perspective of
events to exclude inculpatory facts about the plaintiff/victim, while
90 Id. at 631.
91 Id. at 629-30.
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adopting a broad time frame and a unified perspective to include
exculpatory facts about the plaintiff/victim.
The following chart summarizes these strategies:













When we catalogue the rhetorical strategies in this way, their sym-
metry becomes apparent. What also becomes apparent is their inter-
nal tensions. As in Ibn-Tamas, the plaintiff (or the prosecution) and
the defendant simultaneously may use broad and narrow time frames,
or unified and disjointed perspectives, while describing the same series
of events. The logical tensions in doing this normally are not felt.
Indeed, the true skill of effective rhetoric is precisely the ability to
make these shifts in time framing as invisible or as natural as possible.
III. CHARACTERIZING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PERSONS
A. Characterizations of Free Will, Choice, and Adequate
Alternatives
Assessments of responsibility often depend on our views regarding
the choices available to an actor. The issue of choice arises in several
different ways. First, at the most abstract level, there are questions
about whether a particular actor has free will or whether her behavior
is determined or somehow beyond her control. Issues of free will and
determinism often arise, for example, in diminished capacity and
insanity cases. Second, putting aside ultimate issues of free will and
1990]
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determinism, there is the issue of the degree to which a person's
choices are effectively constrained by circumstances. These issues
include the availability of possible alternative courses of action and
their practicality. Factual circumstances circumscribing effective
choice might include age, education, access to information, emotional,
psychological or physical condition, and economic status. Finally,
issues of responsibility for choices made also arise with respect to
one's responsibility for the choices made by others. Such issues
involve, among other things, whether or not a third party's behavior
is relatively predictable and hence foreseeable.92
The individualist and communalist orientations take relatively
standard and opposite positions regarding these issues. Because the
individualist position stresses the defendant's lack of responsibility, it
deemphasizes the defendant's free will and capacity to make reason-
able, informed decisions, or deemphasizes the existence of alternative
courses of action or their adequacy and efficacy. An individualist
position also may claim that even if a reasonable person in defendant's
position would have perceived alternatives, the defendant's psycho-
logical condition prevented her from understanding and reacting to
her situation properly, and thus her choices were effectively con-
strained. Simultaneously, however, because the individualist orienta-
tion always places responsibility for the victim class on the victims
themselves, the individualist position stresses the victim's free will,
reasoning capacity, and adequate, available alternative courses of
action.
The communalist orientation, unsurprisingly, is precisely the oppo-
site. Since it stresses the defendant's responsibility for the plaintiff's
harm, the communalist argument emphasizes the defendant's free
will, her capacity to make reasoned, informed decisions, and the
many reasonable alternative courses of action by which the defendant
could have avoided harming the plaintiff/victim. Conversely, the
communalist position downplays the responsibility of the victim class
by characterizing the victims as lacking free choice, information, or
any adequate, available alternatives.
92 See Kelman, supra note 3, at 597-98, 642-52 (discussing the use of intentionalism and
determinism as conscious constructs in the criminal law).
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L Self-Defense
For a good example of these rhetorical styles, consider once again
the self-defense case, Ibn-Tamas v. United States,93 in which the
defendant attempted to offer testimony that she was a battered wife.
The prosecution's communalist strategy attempted to establish either
that the defendant's act was unnecessary, and therefore that she acted
with premeditation, or that the defendant acted unreasonably-that
she was a rational being with free will who possessed plenty of alter-
natives other than shooting her husband. Thus, the prosecution pre-
dictably "implied to the jury that the logical reaction of a woman who
was truly frightened by her husband (let alone regularly brutalized by
him) would have been to call the police from time to time or to leave
him." 94 As the prosecutor stated during the closing argument:
"'Maybe she put up with too much too long, although whose fault
was that? She could have gotten out, you know.' 95
The defense's individualist strategy was to demonstrate that, con-
trary to popular belief, a battered wife genuinely believes that she
lacks alternatives because her free will has been affected significantly
by a pattern of physical and mental abuse. The defense offered testi-
mony of a clinical psychologist that:
[W]omen in this situation typically.., feel powerless .... Because
there are periods of [marital] harmony ... the women assume that
they, themselves, are somehow responsible for their husbands' violent
behavior. They also believe, however, that their husbands are capable
of killing them, and they feel there is no escape. Unless a shelter is
available, these women stay with their husbands, not only because
they typically lack a means of self-support but also because they fear
that if they leave they will be found and hurt even more.
96
The defendant's argument in Ibn-Tamas is that from her perspec-
tive, she had no alternatives; her remedies were unavailable, inade-
quate, or futile. The battered wife feels that she is helpless; she
believes that if she tries to leave her husband or attempts to get police
protection he will beat her even more. The prosecution's argument,
conversely, is that the defendant has alternatives-that she has avail-
93 407 A.2d 626.
94 Id. at 633-34.
95 Id. at 634 n.14.
96 Id. at 634.
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able, adequate and efficacious remedies to her situation. She can get a
court order, call the police, or leave home.
Note that in lbn-Tamas, the issue of availability, adequacy, and
efficacy of alternatives is bound up with the choice between an objec-
tive and a subjective standard in self-defense cases. The defense may
argue that even if a normal person would have available alternatives,
this particular defendant could not have escaped her situation because
of her subjective mental condition. This complicating factor is not
always present. In other self-defense situations, both sides may argue
about available alternatives from the perspective of a reasonable per-
son in the defendant's situation. The important point is that in both
Ibn-Tamas and the more standard case, the defendant argues that she
lacks adequate, available alternatives, whether the lack stems from
objective circumstances or subjective constraints.97
97 Compare the arguments that might be raised in State v. Schroeder, 199 Neb. 822, 261
N.W.2d 759 (1978), in which a court upheld a 19-year-old prison inmate's conviction for
assault with intent to inflict great bodily harm. Although the case nominally was argued under
the doctrine of necessity, the similarity ofthe arguments to cases of self-defense is evident. The
defendant stabbed his sleeping cellmate at 1 a.m. Id. at 823-24, 261 N.W.2d at 760. The
defendant argued that his cellmate Riggs "had a reputation among the other prisoners for sex
and violence," that the defendant owed Riggs money, and that Riggs had threatened to make
the defendant into a "punk" (a prisoner who engages in homosexual acts with other prisoners)
by selling the debt to another prisoner. Id. The night of the assault Riggs had told the
defendant "that he might walk in his sleep that night" and "collect some of [the] money"
defendant owed him. Id. at 824, 261 N.W.2d at 760.
The prosecution's argument (and that of the majority) straightforwardly collapsed the time
frame-"there was no specific and imminent threat of injury to the defendant" at the moment
the defendant assaulted Riggs. Id. at 826, 261 N.W.2d at 761. The defendant's argument (and
that of the dissent) manipulates the time frame quite differently. Instead of considering the
situation at the moment of the assault, this perspective views the defendant's predicament as
extending over a longer period of time: "The defendant could not be expected to remain awake
all night, every night, waiting for the attack that Riggs had threatened to make." Id. at 828,
261 N.W.2d at 762 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
The defendant argued that he lacked any reasonable alternative to killing or disabling
Riggs-his remedies were either unavailable, inadequate, or futile. He was confined in a prison
cell with a person who had threatened to force him to submit to sodomy; retreat, therefore,
was not possible. Id. at 825-26, 261 N.W.2d at 761. The defendant and several other cell
members already had requested that Riggs be transferred to another cell, but no action had
been taken on this request. Id. at 824, 261 N.W.2d at 760. The prosecution, naturally,
emphasized that defendant had available, adequate and effective alternatives: He could have
stayed awake that night, and then requested a transfer for himself; or he could have bargained
with the other prisoners in the cell to guard him from Riggs.
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2 Insanity
The trial of John Hinckley, who was accused of attempting to
assassinate President Reagan in 1981, provides excellent examples of
arguments about moral responsibility, free will, and available alterna-
tives. Here, as in Ibn-Tamas, the defense's arguments are not that a
reasonable person in Hinckley's situation would not have perceived
alternatives to assassination, but rather that Hinckley's mental condi-
tion caused his blindness to any alternatives. Under the law as it then
existed, the defense had to establish that a mental disease or defect
substantially impaired either Hinckley's appreciation of the wrongful-
ness of his conduct or his ability to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.98 The prosecution, in turn, set out to prove that
Hinckley was in control of his own actions, was not delusional, and
deliberately chose a course of conduct while understanding its
illegality.
The prosecution's closing arguments use classically communalist
characterizations to emphasize the defendant's free will and available
options:
[The defendant] stalked two Presidents. . . . He target prac-
ticed.... What is he target practicing with different caliber ammuni-
tion for? To pick the best weapon, the deadliest weapon. He found it.
A .22 loaded with Devastator bullets.
It was also planned and premeditated in that... he thought about
it. Dr. Dietz told you of his interest in assassination.... His interest
in fame.... Mr. Hinckley admitted that he had thoughts of assassi-
nating President Reagan as early as December of 1980.
I'm saying this to you to show you that this wasn't a wild, thought-
less, out of control act by a man who couldn't control his behavior.
In fact, at 1:45 when Mr. Reagan arrived, Mr. Hinckley... [did not]
shoot then. He waited for the best shot....
... Mr. Hinckley admitted ... [that] during the period of time
when the President was in the hotel he said, "Should I do it? Should
I not?" He is thinking, deliberating, planning, if you will.99
98 P. Low, J. Jeffries & R. Bonnie, The Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr.: A Case Study in the
Insanity Defense 18, 20, 113 (1986) (setting out the Model Penal Code standard, which was
the law of the District of Columbia and was incorporated into the jury instructions).
99 Id. at 84.
1990] 237
Virginia Law Review
Note as well the prosecution's expansion of the time frame to
include inculpatory facts about the defendant demonstrating his free
will. Nevertheless, when the issue is exculpatory facts about Hinck-
ley, for example his mental attitudes and condition, the prosecution
chose a narrow time frame to exclude them:
[T]his indictment doesn't talk about anything else than March 30,
1981 .... He is not charged here with being sad at Christmas....
He is charged with 13 crimes that happened at 2:20 p.m. on the 30th
of March.
That's the issue in this case and let us see as the day progresses how
much the defense tells you about that.
Isn't it interesting right from the opening statement of the defense,
when Mr. Fuller stood up, you didn't hear about March 30, 1981.
You heard about fantasies, Mr. Hinckley's background, mother,
father, parents, family, good people, Texas Tech, writing, all these
things. Jodie Foster. You didn't hear anything about March 30,
1981.1°°
To demonstrate Hinckley's free will, the prosecution downplayed
the seriousness of Hinckley's emotional condition, arguing that
Hinckley was no worse off emotionally than most Americans. In fact,
the prosecution argued, he was actually much better off than most
because of his affluent background, which gave him opportunities and
choices not available to others. This apparent non sequitur connect-
ing economic advantage with free will clearly was calculated to sug-
gest to the jurors that if Hinckley had emotional problems, they were
largely his own fault. In this way the prosecution attempted to rein-
force the communalist characterization of the defendant as responsi-
ble for his own situation and actions:
John Hinckley led an ordinary American life....
[His family] told you he was a loner .... Dr. Dietz indicated to you
that loneliness is perhaps the most common phenomenon in the
United States and depression or sadness probably runs No. 2.
John was especially lonely. He was especially sad ....
100 Id. at 85-86.
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But these problems didn't prevent Mr. Hinckley from functioning
from day to day, did it? Mr. Hinckley didn't want to work, but that
wasn't because he was psychotic, but because he wanted money from
his parents ....
Mr. Hinckley wanted to go chase after Jodie Foster. That is not
because he was delusional or delirious. It was because he had the
time to do it. Nobody made him work. He didn't have to.
... [He was] flying all over the United States. This man is not a
drifter or a loner stumbling around some little town in Nebraska run-
ning into fence posts. He is flying United Airlines, he is flying Ameri-
can. He took the limousine, if you will, on March 6, 1981, from New
York to Newark Airport. This is probably enough miles there to
qualify for the 10,000-Mile Club in some of these airlines.
Did you ever hear any evidence that Mr. Hinckley didn't have the
ability to make the airline connections, to travel around and do what
he wanted?
... Dr. Dietz... said Mr. Hinckley had a strong desire for fame
Why? Well, you can draw your own conclusions. I suggest to you
Mr. Hinckley developed that over the years because he was sort of the
fifth wheel. Scott [his brother], a successful businessman .... Diane,
successful daughter. Marriage, two children now, I believe, and there
is John Hinckley, sort of loping beside. His dad, a successful busi-
nessman. John Hinckley wanted to be somebody. He wanted to be
like John Lennon, but [he] ... wanted to do this easy. He didn't want
to work. He wanted to get his inheritance, if you will. . .. '
The defense's strategy was symmetrical to the prosecution's. In its
closing arguments, defense counsel chose a broad time frame to
include exculpatory facts that indicated Hinckley was without alter-
natives or free will:
[The government's] psychiatrists chose to ignore the kind of exist-
ence this defendant lived in the seven years prior to March of 1981.
Don't be misled by [the prosecution's] suggestion that only March
30, 1981, should be considered. Is there any way in this world that
Mr. Hinckley or anybody else would become instantly insane on
March 30, 1981? It took years and years of growth of the disease or
101 Id. at 86-88.
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disorder to lead to the state of mind on March 30, 1981.... [T]o
show what he was like [then], we must look at how he got there.
... [L]ook at the absolutely absurd travel pattern pursued by this
man starting on September 17th and running through March of 1981.
On its face, it is irrational, purposeless, aimless.
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, I submit to you that Mr. Hinck-
ley at the time of these events was living in such a self-contained
world with no outside checks, no possibility of there being any reali-
ties, that he was unaware of anything except his goal and his goal was
to achieve the love and admiration of Jodie Foster.
... He was a prisoner of himself for at least seven years before this
tragedy.., to call him an ordinary... all American boy, is-silly.1"2
The defense emphasized Hinckley's "'disconnected' " college
career, " 'a semester here, a semester out,' "his trips to California and
Nashville to become a rock star when there was no evidence of prior
musical training or talent, 10 3 his fascination with the movie Taxi
Driver and its star, Jodie Foster, and other strange and unusual
behavior occurring over a span of years. 1" Additionally, the defense
argued that the defendant's mental stress, which had developed
through a series of other events, culminated in March of 1981 when
his parents refused to allow him to stay with them; this rejection effec-
tively severed his last tie to reality."5 In short, the defense attempted
to portray Hinckley as a man without control over his actions, and
thus lacking the will or mental capacity to choose available alterna-
tives to assassination.
3. Causation
In Commonwealth v. Feinberg,10 6 the defendant operated a cigar
store in a skid row area of Philadelphia. He regularly stocked and
sold Sterno, and there was evidence that he knew that some of his
customers consumed the Sterno as a substitute for liquor. He
received a new shipment of less expensive "industrial Sterno" that
102 Id. at 93-94.
103 Id. at 94.
104 Id. at 94-96.
105 Id. at 100-01.
106 433 Pa. 558, 253 A.2d 636 (1969).
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had a higher concentration of methanol, which made it far more dan-
gerous to consume internally. Imprinted on the lids of the new Sterno
was the warning: "'Institutional Sterno. Danger. Poison. For use
only as a Fuel. Not for consumer use. For industrial and commercial
use. Not for home use.'" Defendant sold approximately 400 cans of
the new Sterno. During the period of those sales thirty-one persons in
the skid-row area died from methanol poisoning. A substantial
number of those deaths were traced to the consumption of industrial
Sterno purchased from the defendant's store. Defendant was indicted
and convicted of manslaughter, and the court upheld his sentence on
appeal. 107
Defendant argued that the prosecution had not shown that he prox-
imately caused the deaths of his customers. After all, they had a
choice whether or not to purchase and then ingest the Sterno, and the
inappropriateness of the product for internal consumption was clearly
apparent from the label.10 8 The defendant emphasized the free will of
the victims and the alternatives available to them; the victims did not
have to consume the Sterno because other, safer substances were
available. Thus, the defendant argued, their free choice to endanger
themselves broke the causal chain and excused him from liability.
In rejecting this argument, the court implicitly adopted a narrow
view of the victims' free will and available alternatives. The defend-
ant should have known, and indeed, the Court suggests, did know,
that the victims near his store were alcoholics; the defendant knew
that their actions were relatively predictable.109 Moreover, their
decrepit state gave them little hope of resisting the temptation to
purchase the cheaper Sterno, and gave them few realistic alternatives.
Note that the choices available to the victims appear narrower and
narrower, and the predictability of their response appears greater and
greater, as the time frame is collapsed. The defendant might argue
that the denizens of his neighborhood had a number of long-term
alternatives to consuming contaminated Sterno, such as joining
Alcoholics Anonymous, getting a job, and escaping poverty. Thus, it
is important to recognize that, just as in the Hinckley case, characteri-
zations of free will or the existence of alternatives often depend on
107 Id. at 560-61, 568, 573, 253 A.2d at 638, 641, 644.




manipulation of time frames. 110 Here the defendant's individualist
argument adopts a broad time frame to emphasize the victims'
responsibility, while the court's communalist opinion adopts a narrow
time frame to deemphasize it."'
The same connection between time framing and characterizations
of the victim's free will or available alternatives is also clear from
cases involving the suicide of the victim as a result of defendant's neg-
ligent or criminal behavior. Again, an individualist view of defend-
ant's causal responsibility would characterize the plaintiff broadly as a
free moral agent who knowingly decided to take her own life, thus
breaking the causal chain of responsibility. Simultaneously, the
defendant also might emphasize that other events, either unforesee-
able or beyond the defendant's control, drove the plaintiff to her
act." 2 And again a communalist view of defendant's causal responsi-
bility would emphasize how defendant's freely chosen negligent or
criminal acts had foreseeable consequences that robbed plaintiff of the
will to live, and would minimize the autonomous nature of plaintiff's
actions, or the effect of other events on the plaintiff's decision.
In the famous case of Stephenson v. State," 3 the defendant kid-
napped the victim and sexually abused her over the course of several
days. While in the hotel to which she had been taken, she purchased
and took poison. Eventually she died from a combination of factors,
including physical abuse and poisoning." 4 The defendant argued that
the victim's actions broke the causal chain; he thus emphasized her
free will and available alternatives: "[A]fter [the defendant and the
victim] reached the hotel, Madge Oberholtzer left the hotel and
110 Cf. Kelman, supra note 3, at 638-39 (discussing the manipulation of an act/omission
distinction in a fact situation similar to Feinberg).
II1 The defendant's knowledge of the likely consequences of selling this particular variety of
Sterno also may depend on time frame manipulation. From a broader time frame, it is more
likely that the defendant had some knowledge of what his customers did with his product.
Manipulating the time frame also makes the defendant appear to have different alternatives. If
we expand the time frame, the defendant's choice to purchase the cheaper Sterno for resale
when more expensive but safer versions were available in the market looks more blameworthy.
From a narrow time frame, we look at the moral choices available to a storekeeper who
already has invested considerable amounts of money in cans of Sterno that lie unpurchased on
the shelf. Economic necessity might not be a defense to this criminal prosecution, but just as
in the case of the victims, it tends to make the actor seem less blameworthy.
112 See, e.g., Scheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1881).
113 205 Ind. 141, 179 N.E. 633 (1932).
114 Id. at 167-77, 179 N.E. at 642-45.
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purchased a hat and the poison, and voluntarily returned to his room,
and at the time she took the poison she was in an adjoining room...
and ... he was not present." '115
The court's decision rejected defendant's argument and emphasized
that:
[T]he deceased had, before she left appellant's home in Indianapolis,
attempted to get away, and also made two unsuccessful attempts to
use the telephone to call help. She was justified in concluding that
any attempt she might make, while purchasing a hat or while in the
drug store to escape or secure assistance would be no more successful
in Hammond than it was in Indianapolis." 6
In Stephenson, the court faces a difficult problem in establishing a lack
of free will through the usually simple expedient of shrinking the time
frame. Although the court emphasizes the victim's helplessness at the
moment she swallowed the poison, it must still explain how her will
could have been overborne by an act that occurred several hours ear-
lier. The court solves this problem by collapsing the time frame in a
novel way-by treating the events as part of a single unit, rather than
as disjointed and separated:
Neither do we think the fact that the deceased took the poison some
four hours later after ... the crime of attempted rape had been com-
mitted necessarily prevents it from being a part of the attempted
rape.... At the very moment Madge Oberholtzer swallowed the poison
she was subject to the passion, desire, and will of appellant. She knew
not what moment she would be subjected to the same demands that
she was while in the drawing-room on the train.... The whole crimi-
nal program was so closely connected that we think it should be treated
as one transaction ....
4. Necessity
The question of available, adequate alternatives is usually present in
cases raising the defense of necessity."' This question is obvious in a
case like Regina v. Dudley & Stephens,'1 9 which involved cannibalism
aboard a life boat. The prosecution emphasized that the defendants
"5 Id. at 183, 179 N.E. at 647.
116 Id. at 188, 179 N.E. at 649.
117 Id. at 188-89, 179 N.E. at 649 (emphasis added).
I's See discussion of Schroeder, supra note 97.
119 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884); see supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
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had alternatives to killing the victim and eating him immediately. At
the moment when the boy was killed, there was no particular emer-
gency; the defendants were not at the point of death and there was no
threat of imminent harm. This argument emphasizes their alterna-
tives: The defendants could have waited a few more days either for
help to arrive or for the boy to die of natural causes before commit-
ting their act of cannibalism, or they could have drawn lots. The
defense argued, on the contrary, that the circumstances constrained
their actions. When one considers the defendants' situation not sim-
ply as a series of discrete instants but as a unified set of circumstances,
their predicament required them to act-if not at a particular
moment, then at least soon. They had no reason to think that help
would come within a few days, and their steadily worsening condition
left them no alternatives. 1
20
In United States v. Kroncke,121 the defendants broke into a local
draft office to destroy files and registration cards. They argued that
this action was necessary to bring to the attention of Congress and the
public the immorality and illegality of the Vietnam War, because
there was no effective political or legal recourse.122 The implicit claim
was that they had no adequate, available, and effective alternatives to
the burglary, and that destroying draft files would help bring an end
to the war. 123
The appellate court disagreed, holding that the defense of necessity
was inappropriate because "the relationship between the defendant's
act and the 'good' to be accomplished is . . . tenuous and uncer-
tain," 124 thus denying the necessity of their course of action, but
more importantly because "there are broad opportunities for peaceful
and legal dissent, and ... the power of the ballot, if used, is great."1 25
120 Note that both the prosecution and the defense simultaneously take positions on the
issue of exculpatory causation that are in tension with their arguments about the nature of the
emergency. The prosecution's argument that nothing the defendants could do was likely to
save their lives (a narrow view of exculpatory causation) tends to undercut the prosecution's
argument that there was no imminent peril that required immediate action. Conversely, the
defendants' assertion that their situation was hopeless is in tension with the simultaneous
assertion that killing the boy would surely increase their chances of survival.
121 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972).
122 Id. at 699.
123 See id. at 699, 702.
124 Id. at 701.
125 Id. at 704.
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Like many necessity cases, Kronke offers excellent examples of time
frame manipulation to establish inculpatory and exculpatory facts.
The defense introduced several witnesses who testified to the evils of
the Vietnam War and the need to end its injustices. The prosecution
argued, and the trial judge agreed, that all this testimony was immate-
rial and that the time frame should be narrowed. Thus the trial judge
charged that the jury should consider only "the facts concerning what
occurred at Little Falls, Minnesota on the late evening of July 10,
1970. "126 Of course, the prosecution would argue for a broad time
frame in order to include inculpatory facts, such as evidence of the
planning and preparation of the break-in.
In Kroncke, as in Dudley & Stephens, the individualist argument is
that the defendant's acts greatly increase the chances that better con-
sequences will follow: The causal nexus between these acts and the
desired state of affairs (or avoiding the greater evil) is strong--or the
act greatly increases the marginal probability that the better conse-
quences will follow. The risk, or marginal probability, of harm or
additional harm if the defendant does not act is very great. This per-
spective is a narrow view of causal probabilities that inculpate the
defendants and a broad view of causal probabilities that exculpate
them.
The communalist response in each case is that the defendant's acts
do not increase greatly the chance that better consequences will
occur: The causal nexus between these acts and the desired state of
affairs (or avoiding the greater evil) is weak--or the act only mini-
mally increases or does not increase at all the marginal probability
that the better consequences will occur. The risk (or marginal
probability) of harm or additional harm if the defendant does not act
is slight. This position is a broad view of causal probabilities that
inculpate the defendants and a narrow view of causal probabilities
that exculpate them. 12
7
The symmetry of arguments concerning free will and the existence
of adequate, available alternatives is summarized below:
126 Id. at 700.
127 The communalist argument might choose to focus instead on the gross or absolute
probabilities that defendants' act would avoid a serious harm if these probabilities seemed
fairly small. See supra note 59.
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VIEW OF FREE WILL, CHOICE, INFORMATION, OR ADEQUATE
AVAILABLE OPTIONS
Individualist Communalist
Of plaintiff Broad Narrow
Of defendant Narrow Broad
Figure 4
B. Shifting Moral and Causal Responsibility to
and from Third Parties
The individualist orientation attempts to shift responsibility away
from the defendant. We already have seen that this shifting can be
accomplished by deemphasizing the defendant's moral or causal
responsibility for the plaintiff/victim's injury, while emphasizing the
plaintiff/victim's responsibility for her own predicament. A further
strategy involves shifting responsibility not onto the plaintiff/victim,
but onto third parties who in some way may have contributed to the
plaintiff/victim's harm. The individualist position emphasizes the
free will, adequate alternatives, fault, bad intention, and causal
responsibility of third parties who harm (rather than aid) the plain-
tiff/victim. 128 The individualist position also deemphasizes the fore-
seeability and predictability of third-party actions that harm the
plaintiff/victim, as well as the defendant's control over such parties.
Because the communalist position seeks to emphasize the defend-
ant's responsibility, it takes precisely the opposite approach; it stresses
that third parties who harm the plaintiff/victim lacked free will or
adequate, available alternatives, that these parties' actions were fore-
seeable or predictable by the defendant, and that the third parties
were somehow under the defendant's control. Hence the defendant is
responsible for what third parties do to the plaintiff/victim.
128 The defendant's individualist argument also emphasizes the degree of the third parties'
contribution to the plaintiff/victim's harm. For example, in a tort case with multiple
defendants, each defendant tries to establish that the other defendants were responsible for
most of the harm, could have avoided the harm more easily, or had greater freedom of choice.
Note that this Section only considers the defendant's responsibility for acts of a third party
that harm the plaintiff/victim. Where the question presented is the defendant's responsibility
for a third party who helps the plaintiff/victim avoid harm, the rhetorical devices used by each
side obviously would be quite different.
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1. Causation
Brower v. New York Central & Hudson River R.R., 1z 9 involved a
grade crossing collision between the defendant's train and the plain-
tiff's horse-drawn wagon. The collision knocked the plaintiff uncon-
scious, and thieves presumably stole the contents of the wagon. The
railroad detectives, while posting a guard to protect the railroad's
property from thieves, did not attempt to protect the plaintiff's prop-
erty. 130 The plaintiff argued that the railroad's negligence in causing
the collision made it responsible for the loss of the stolen merchan-
dise, and the majority agreed, concluding that the plaintiff could
recover."' The majority's communalist argument deemphasized the
plaintiff's responsibility for protecting himself and held that the
defendant was responsible because the third parties' actions were fore-
seeable under the circumstances:
The negligence which caused the collision resulted immediately in
such a condition of the driver of the wagon that he was no longer able
to protect his employer's property; the natural and probable result of
his enforced abandonment of it in the street of a large city was its
disappearance; and the wrongdoer cannot escape making reparation
for the loss caused by depriving the plaintiff of the protection which
the presence of the driver in his right senses would have afforded.132
The dissent's argument against recovery was individualist. It
emphasized that the free actions of third parties insulated the defend-
ant from liability:
Proximate cause imports unbroken continuity between cause and
effect, which, both in law and in logic, is broken by the active inter-
vention of an independent criminal actor. This established rule of law
is defeated if proximate cause be confounded with mere opportunity
for crime. A maladjusted switch may be the proximate cause of the
death of a passenger who was killed by the derailment of the train, or
by the fire or collision that ensued, but it is not the proximate cause of
the death of a passenger who was murdered by a bandit who boarded
the train because of the opportunity afforded by its derailment. This
clear distinction is not met by saying that criminal intervention
should be foreseen, for this implies that crime is to be presumed and
129 91 N.J.L. 190, 103 A. 166 (1918).
130 Id. at 191, 103 A. at 166-67.




the law is directly otherwise. 133
Hines v. Garrett134 and Henderson v. Dade Coal Co.135 are two
good examples of third-party causation cases reaching contrary
results. In Henderson, a coal company that leased convicts from the
local authorities to work in its mines negligently had allowed one of
them to escape. 136 The escaped convict raped the plaintiff. The plain-
tiff argued that the defendants should have known from his character
that the convict was likely to rape someone if let loose. 137 The court,
emphasizing the free will of the third party who had harmed the
plaintiff, sustained a demurrer for the defendant:
Vile as this man was, it cannot be held that the defendants could rea-
sonably have anticipated that he would, upon the first opportunity,
assault and ravish any defenseless woman whom he might encounter.
He was equally liable to commit some other heinous crime; and they
were not bound to presume that he would commit any crime at all.' 3 s
In Hines, a railroad conductor negligently carried the eighteen-
year-old plaintiff past her stop one night, forcing her to walk back one
mile through a dangerous area. During her journey she was raped
once by a soldier and once by a hobo, both unidentified. 139 Unsurpris-
ingly, the railroad company stressed the plaintiff's free will and avail-
able options." More importantly for the comparison with
Henderson, however, the railroad company argued that it could not
133 Id. at 194, 103 A. at 168 (Garrison, J., dissenting); cf. H. Hart & A. Honore, Causation
in the Law 129 (1959) ("[T]he free, deliberate and informed act or omission of a human being,
intended to produce the consequence which is in fact produced, negatives causal connexion."
(emphasis omitted)).
134 131 Va. 125, 108 S.E. 690 (1921).
'35 100 Ga. 568, 28 S.E. 251 (1897).
136 See id. at 570, 28 S.E. at 252.
137 See id. at 570-71, 28 S.E. at 252.
138 Id.
139 Hines, 131 Va. 125, 129-30, 108 S.E. 690, 691.
140 The railroad argued that the plaintiff was at fault for having gotten off the train; at that
point she ceased to be a passenger and the railroad was no longer responsible for her. Thus,
the railroad argued that the conductor offered the plaintiff two options-getting off the train
immediately or remaining on the train until it returned to her stop some time later-and that
the plaintiff voluntarily choose to leave the train. Id. at 132-33, 108 S.E. at 692. Similarly, the
railroad argued that its options were limited greatly once it discovered that a train bad passed
its appointed stop. It might have been unsafe or inconvenient to the other passengers to back
the train to the previous stop; in fact the railroad had a rule prohibiting movement against the
[Vol. 76:197248
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be held causally responsible for the rapists' actions. The court, how-
ever, permitted recovery:
The consequences which overtook this young woman were sufficiently
probable to charge any responsible party with the duty of guarding
against them. No eighteen-year-old girl should be required to set out
alone, near nightfall, to walk along an unprotected route, passing a
spot which is physically so situated as to lend itself to the perpetua-
tion of a criminal assault, and which is infested by worthless, irre-
sponsible and questionable characters known as tramps and hoboes;
and no prudent man, charged with her care, would willingly cause
her to do so.
1 4 1
Thus, the defendant was causally responsible because it
expose[d] the injured party to the act causing the injury. It is per-
fectly well settled and will not be seriously denied that wherever a
carrier has reason to anticipate the danger of an assault upon one of
its passengers, it rests under the duty of protecting such passenger
against the same.142
2. Duty
Similar rhetorical strategies appear in debates concerning whether
or not the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff when third parties
cause the harm. 143 Such issues are implicated, for example, in cases
involving: (1) the duty to warn potential plaintiffs of harms that might
current of traffic without specific orders from the superintendent of transportation. Id. at 134-
35, 108 S.E. at 693.
The court, however, adopted a communalist position, accepting a broad view of the
defendant's available options while narrowly describing the plaintiff's options. The court
argued that a jury could have found that backing the train would not have "caused the other
passengers any risk or disproportionate inconvenience," and that the risk of danger was
minimized because no scheduled train would follow soon. Id. at 135, 108 S.E. at 693. At the
same time, the jury could have found that the plaintiff's decision to leave was not fully
voluntary, because "[s]he was suddenly placed in a perplexing situation" by a conductor who
treated her rudely and did not explain how long she would have to remain on the train before
it would return to her stop. Id.
141 Id. at 138, 108 S.E. at 694.
142 Id. at 140, 108 S.E. at 695.
143 This was, in fact, an issue in Hines v. Garrett: the duty was that of a common carrier to
protect its passengers. The similarity and overlap between questions of duty and questions of
causation is a familiar issue in tort law, especially in cases involving third parties who injure
the plaintiff. See generally Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 274-75 (W. Keeton 5th ed.
1984) (noting that "[i]t is quite possible" to restate questions of proximate cause as questions of
duty).
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be caused by persons with whom the defendant has a special relation-
ship (or the duty to restrain those persons); 144 (2) the duty to warn or
protect persons with whom the defendant has a special relationship
from harms caused by third parties;14 5 (3) employers' vicarious liabil-
ity for their servants' acts;14 6 and (4) the government's responsibility
for private parties' infringement of the plaintiff/victim's rights.147
A good example of arguments concerning the scope of a defend-
ant's duty is Lopez v. Southern California Rapid Transit District,48 in
which the plaintiffs sued a local transit district for injuries they
received when a fight broke out among passengers aboard a bus.14 9 In
explaining why the transit district owed a duty arising out of a special
relationship to its passengers, the court emphasized the plaintiffs'
helpless condition and the defendant's ability to foresee violence on
crowded buses:
[B]us passengers are "sealed into a moving steel cocoon." Large
numbers of strangers are forced into very close physical contact with
one another under conditions that often are crowded, noisy, and over-
heated. At the same time, the means of entering and exiting the bus
are limited and under the exclusive control of the bus driver. Thus,
passengers have no control over who is admitted on the bus and, if
trouble arises, are wholly dependent upon the bus driver to summon
help or provide a means of escape. These characteristics of buses are,
at the very least, conducive to outbreaks of violence between passen-
gers and at the same time significantly limit the means by which pas-
sengers can protect themselves from assaults by fellow passengers.
150
Of course, the plaintiffs' options are much smaller when viewed
from a narrow time frame. The defendant might have replied that
plaintiffs did have alternatives; if they did not wish to ride buses in
such crowded conditions, they simply could have found alternative
means of transportation.15 1 Moreover, as the defendant transit dis-
144 See Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr.
14 (1976).
145 See Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976).
146 Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
147 See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968).
148 40 Cal. 3d 780, 710 P.2d 907, 221 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1985).
149 Id. at 783, 710 P.2d at 908, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
150 Id. at 789, 710 P.2d at 912, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (footnote omitted).
151 Plaintiffs could respond that their economic situation limits their choice of
transportation. And defendant can respond to this argument by expanding the time frame still
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trict argued, its ability to predict and prevent criminal acts on its
buses is severely limited: Prevention would require an armed security
force, and the combination of these expenses and the payment of
money damages might bankrupt the transit district.152 In response,
the court emphasized the defendant's available alternatives:
Finding such a duty to exist is not the functional equivalent of find-
ing a duty to provide an armed security guard on every bus. There
are a number of actions a carrier might take ... which ... might be
sufficient to meet the duty .... For instance, where the disorderly
conduct of certain passengers threatens the safety of others, the bus
driver (subject, of course, to reasonable concern for his own safety),
might warn the unruly passengers to quiet down or get off the bus;
alert the police and summon their assistance; or, if necessary, eject the
unruly passengers .... Carriers could provide radio communication
between the bus driver and local police or bus headquarters to enable
the driver to call for assistance when needed, and buses could be
equipped with alarm lights to alert nearby police or carrier personnel
of criminal activity taking place on board the bus. Bus drivers, espe-
cially those on routes with a history of criminal activity, could be
trained to recognize and deal with potentially volatile situations.
more; the plaintiffs have the choice where to work, at what occupations, wages, working
conditions, and so on. It should be clear at this point that many of the familiar debates
concerning economic justice involve symmetrical expansion and contraction of time frames.
152 40 Cal. 3d at 786-87, 710 P.2d at 910, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
153 Id. at 787-88, 710 P.2d at 910-11, 221 Cal. Rptr. 844 (citations omitted).
Compare the arguments made by the court in Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp, 439 F.2d
477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The plaintiff was assaulted and robbed one night in the common hallway
of her apartment building. She sued the landlord for negligently failing to provide protection
for tenants. The majority opinion held that she stated a cause of action. Id. at 478-80. Its
communalist arguments use the standard rhetorical devices. On the one hand, the court, using
a narrow time frame, argued that the plaintiff had no adequate alternative means of ensuring
her own safety. Id. at 480. On the other hand, the court, now using a broad time frame,
emphasized the predictability and foreseeability of criminal attacks in the area, id. at 483, the
landlord's actual and constructive notice of a real danger to the tenants, id. at 479-80 & n.3,
483, and the available measures the landlord could have taken to protect the tenants. Id. at
480, 484, 486. The court also stressed that previously the landlord had provided protection in
the form of a doorman, garage attendants and a desk clerk, but these positions were no longer
staffed by the time of the assault, even in the face of increasing numbers of assaults, larcenies
and robberies. Id. at 479.
The dissenting opinion, predictably enough, used all of the opposite rhetorical strategies. It
pointed out that the plaintiff was well aware of the decreased protection in her building and
could have moved to a safer building, presumably with higher rental costs. Id. at 492-93
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting). The dissent also emphasized that there was no inequality of
bargaining power between the tenants and the landlord. Id. at 493 n.10 (MacKinnon, J.
Virginia Law Review
The chart below illustrates the symmetry of rhetorical strategies
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We can sum up the argument of this Article in the following chart,
which lists the basic categories of factual characterization and the cor-
responding devices employed by the individualist and communalist
orientations. This chart dramatically displays the claim made
throughout this Article that individualism and communalism are mir-
ror images, or rhetorical transformations, of each other:




dissenting). Moreover, it stressed the insufficiency of evidence that criminal activity was
frequent and predictable in the particular building where the tenant lived, as opposed to the
general metropolitan area, id. at 489, 491 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting), the landlord's lack of
knowledge and certainty as to the frequency and nature of the attacks, id. at 489 (MacKinnon,
J., dissenting), and the futility, impracticability, and prohibitive expense of the landlord
investing in safety measures. Id. at 490, 492-93 (MacKinnon, 3., dissenting).
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IV. RESPONSIBILITY AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS
So far this Article has examined the ways in which we use rhetori-
cal devices to emphasize or deemphasize responsibility. The rhetori-
cal strategies discussed above, however, also are found in arguments
for and against the recognition and regulation of particular rights.
This claim should be hardly surprising, as one of the standard argu-
ments against holding a defendant responsible for her conduct is that
she had a right to do what she did.
Thus, the assertion and protection of rights is connected intimately
with issues of personal responsibility. Rights can be viewed, and
occasionally have been viewed, as spheres of private activity into
which the state may not intrude, and within which the holder of the
right may act with impunity.1 5 4 Hohfeldian analysis confirms this
view. In Hohfeldian terms, a "privilege" (or liberty right) to act cre-
ates a correlative "no-right" on the part of others to have the state
prevent the actor from exercising the right.
1 55
For this reason, debates about whether or not a person has a partic-
ular right, or over whether or not a right extends to a particular
degree, mirror debates about personal responsibility. Saying that a
right extends to particular activity is often another way of saying that
the person exercising that right has no legal responsibility for her
actions. Of course, that is not all we are saying when we claim that a
person has or does not have a particular right. Claims of legal respon-
sibility, however, usually are implicated in claims of legal right. 5 6 A
154 For an historical grounding, see Horwitz, Rights, 23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 393
(1988).
155 Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 30, 32-33. If the possessor of the liberty right also has a
stronger claim right, or a "right" proper in Hohfeldian terminology, then there is also a
correlative duty on the part of others not to interfere with the exercise of the claim right. The
point here, however, is that even with respect to the lesser Hohfeldian "privilege," or liberty
right, the holder of the privilege may act (if she is otherwise able) without fear of liability.
156 I should note here, in pointing out the connection between claims of right and claims of
responsibility, the relevance of the separation between law and morals. Few people believe
that a person's moral responsibilities are always coterminous with the exercise of her legal
rights. For example, we might argue that a person is morally responsible for a particular harm
but decide that our theory of legal rights requires the person to escape punishment or
regulation. My point, however, is that in this case we say that the person is not legally
responsible for the harm her actions caused. Conversely, we might believe that a person was
well within her moral rights to perform a certain act (or at least violated no one else's moral
rights), and yet argue that legally she should be punished or her activity regulated, either out
of administrative convenience or necessity, institutional concerns, or considerations of social
254 [Vol. 76:197
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claim of legal right thus can be defended by all of the various devices
associated with the individualist position. Therefore, arguments for
protecting a right whose exercise injures a victim normally emphasize
the victim's responsibility for her own injury, use a narrow time frame
to exclude inculpatory facts about the exercise of the right, use a
broad time frame to include exculpatory facts, and so forth.
One can see this phenomenon best by comparing two different
rights that, in mainstream legal ideology, receive quite different treat-
ment: the rights of speech and economic exchange. In modem (post-
1937) constitutional law, speech, even quite harmful speech, is given
extraordinary protection, while we have seen increasing restrictions
on the freedom of contract and expanding tort liability for manufac-
turers and other businesses. Indeed, the opposite positions-that
speech that has undesirable or injurious effects routinely could be reg-
ulated, and that the right to contract should receive strong constitu-
tional protection-are presently out of the mainstream of legal
thought, although each position has its adherents and perhaps may
come into vogue again.
157
The dominant justifications of free speech often involve individual-
ist factual characterizations. We do not hold speakers legally respon-
sible for many of the harms their speech may cause to others. Even in
cases of very dangerous speech, a speaker cannot be held directly
responsible unless there is a clear and present danger of immediate
violence, and courts usually characterize facts so that this test is quite
difficult to meet in practice.15 8 Similarly, first amendment libertarians
often recharacterize the causal nexus between speech and the harms
costs and benefits. In this case, however, we are arguing that although she was not morally
responsible, she was nevertheless legally responsible. Of course, in other cases it may be quite
unclear whether our judgments about responsibility are moral, legal, or based upon some
combination of both perspectives.
157 Here I must emphasize that the issue of what protection should be accorded to a right is
not a matter of complete protection or nonprotection, but is always a question of degree and
kind. The mainstream position is much more protective of speech than contract. Yet even the
mainstream position recognizes that some types of speech can be regulated (i.e., libel, pejury,
bribery, etc.). And within the mainstream view of thinking on contractual freedom, there are
limits to the state's regulatory power. The takings and contracts clauses are not yet a dead
letter in our constitutional jurisprudence, and a statute prohibiting all commercial transactions
of any kind, if it could be passed, probably would not survive even the limited scrutiny now
given to economic regulation.
158 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445-47 (1969).
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alleged to be caused by it as insignificant or at best speculative, 5 9 and
deemphasize the harms to victims arising from speech.16°
A strongly libertarian position on the first amendment tends to shift
responsibility for harm from the speaker to the listener or victim.
This perspective portrays persons who claim to be injured by speech
as responsible for their own failure to avoid harm or otherwise
improve their situation.1 61  Similarly, free speech libertarians often
depict the victims as having adequate, available alternatives to suffer-
ing the harm caused by speech that offends them or with which they
disagree. 162
Finally, a strongly pro-free speech position usually characterizes
the speaker as not ultimately responsible for the harm caused by third
parties as a result of the speaker's expression. This lack of responsi-
bility is either because the causal nexus between persuasion (or agita-
159 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown
man, without more, would present any immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the
success of the government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so.").
Alternatively, courts taking pro-speech stands in free speech cases can argue that the
legislature has not made a sufficient showing that the harms feared will occur, see, e.g.,
Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841 (1978) ("The Commonwealth has
offered little more than assertion and conjecture to support its claim that without criminal
sanctions the objectives of the statutory scheme would be seriously undermined."), or that
there has not been a particularized finding that they will occur in the particular case before the
court, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971) ("We have been shown no evidence that
substantial numbers of citizens are standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may
assault their sensibilities with execrations like that uttered by Cohen.").
160 Or the claim is made that there has not been a sufficient showing that the harm is as
great as the legislature fears.
161 The classic version of this argument is that persons who are affronted by offensive visual
expression merely need to "avert[] their eyes." See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. The
communalist (and therefore less speech-protective) rejoinder is that the victims are part of a
captive audience and therefore lack effective means to avoid the harm caused by the speech.
See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("[T]he broadcast media have
established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans. Patently offensive,
indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen ... in the privacy of the
home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment
rights of an intruder.").
162 This view is implicit in the traditional marketplace of ideas justification of free speech,
and in the claim that "the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones." Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Note the broad time framing
that the marketplace of ideas metaphor implies. It is used to shift responsibility to the victim,
just as an individualist argument does in the context of economic rights. See supra note 151.
Conversely, the victim class uses a narrow time frame to demonstrate the futility or
inadequacy of counter-speech.
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tion) and action is too remote or uncertain, or because the third
parties so agitated or persuaded are viewed as independent moral
actors who freely choose to engage in the undesirable conduct or else
have adequate, available alternatives to harming the victim. Thus, the
speaker's control over the effects of her speech, and in particular, her
control over third-party reactions to it, is deemphasized.
It is interesting to compare these factual characterizations with
those used by courts before speech received the high level of protec-
tion it enjoys today. For example, in the early World War I free
speech cases, the courts presumed that defendants intended the rea-
sonable and foreseeable consequences of their speech, including the
foreseeable acts of third parties who might be goaded into action by
the speech. 163 Even after the Supreme Court adopted the clear and
present danger test in Schenck v. United States,"6 courts routinely
emphasized the likelihood and magnitude of the harms that might
accrue from radical expressive activity.
165
Of course, when the right involved is not speech but contract, fac-
tual depictions change quite dramatically. One need only compare
Schneider v. State,166 an early case taking a strong pro-speech position
in the area of time, place, and manner regulation, with a case like
163 E.g., Schaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1919) (upholding the denial
of a directed verdict for the defendant charged under the Espionage Act for mailing a book
decrying patriotism as "'murder and the spirit of the devil.'" The court held that even
though the book did not mention recruitment, enlistment, or service, denigrating patriotism
and labeling the war effort as immoral and criminal would tend to harm enlistment, and it is
enough if "the natural and probable tendency and effect of the words quoted therefrom are
such as are calculated to produce the result condemned by the statute.").
164 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
165 Id. In the alternative, courts deferred to legislative determinations that the harm was
sufficiently great as to require regulation. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925)
("[T]he State has determined, through its legislative body, that utterances advocating the
overthrow of organized government by force, violence and unlawful means, are so inimical to
the general welfare and involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be penalized in
the exercise of its police power. That determination must be given great weight."). Id. at 669
("The State cannot reasonably be required to measure the danger from every such utterance in
the nice balance of a jewelers scale. A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that,
smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration.").
During the McCarthy Era, these same communalist arguments reemerged. See, e.g., Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance) ("It is
not for us to decide how we would adjust the clash of interest which this case presents were the
primary responsibility for reconciling it ours. Congress has determined that the danger
created by advocacy of overthrow justifies the ensuing restriction on freedom of speech.").
166 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,6 7 holding a defendant liable for neg-
ligently failing to design a "crashworthy" vehicle-a car that mini-
mizes injuries to the driver in the event of a collision.
In Schneider, the Court confronted a series of ordinances from dif-
ferent jurisdictions that prohibited the distribution of handbills on
streets or in other public places.168 The justification for this prohibi-
tion was that it helped to prevent littering. The lower court reasoned
that although the handbill distributor may not have intended it,
"[e]xperience teaches that the immediate result of the indiscriminate
distribution of handbills on public streets is the littering of those
streets."'' 69 The Supreme Court rejected this communalist characteri-
zation-communalist because the defendant was held responsible for
the predictable acts of third parties that harmed the public interest. It
argued that absent sufficient state interest, as in this case, the govern-
ment could not criminalize "handing literature to one willing to
receive it,' 70 and that the city had alternatives to punishing the
defendant-namely "punish[ing] ... those who actually throw papers
on the streets."'
17 1
The Court's argument is, in practical terms, individualist-the
Constitution requires that the leaflet recipient must be considered the
responsible party, not the defendant, who has no control over what
the recipient does with it. As if to emphasize the defendant's lack of
causal responsibility, the Court describes littering as merely an "indi-
rect" consequence of leafleting.' 72 Additionally, the Court holds that
"[a]ny burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning and car-
ing for the streets as an indirect consequence of such distribution
results from the constitutional protection of the freedom of speech
and press."' 17  Here the Court is quite direct in placing the legal
responsibility for cleaning up the litter on the injured party (here the
city, representing its citizens) and not on the alleged injurer (the
leafleter). Moreover, far from being powerless to prevent the harm,
167 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
168 One of the four ordinances prohibited canvassing without a permit. Schneider, 308 U.S.
at 154-59.
169 People v. Young, 33 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 747, 751-52, 85 P.2d 231, 233 (1938), rev'd sub
nom. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (overturning the Los Angeles ordinance).
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the injured party (the city) has plenty of alternatives. It simply can
direct its enforcement efforts at the truly responsible parties-the
litterers.
By contrast, Larsen held that General Motors could be held legally
responsible for designing a car that, although not dangerous when
driven carefully, might create additional hazards to a driver involved
in an accident.174 The court, in other words, required the defendant
to take into account the effects of negligence by either the victim her-
self or a third party who crashed into her. An individualist argument
along the lines of that in Schneider would have stressed that the
defendant is not responsible for the plaintiff's or third parties' freely
chosen actions that result in injury, even if it is predictable that some
automobile accidents will happen. For example, in an earlier case,
Evans v. General Motors Corp., 75 a court argued that "the defendant
also knows that its automobiles may be driven into bodies of water,
but it is not suggested that defendant has a duty to equip them with
pontoons."
' 176
The court's argument in Larsen reflects the generally communalist
rhetoric characteristic of tort law in the latter half of this century.
Where the plaintiff suffers "injuries or enhanced injuries ... due to
the manufacturer's failure to use reasonable care to avoid subjecting
the user of its products to an unreasonable risk of injury"' 177 the man-
ufacturer is responsible. Moreover, the court emphasized that
"[c]ollisions with or without fault of the user are clearly foreseeable
by the manufacturer and are statistically inevitable."178 Finally, while
downplaying the plaintiff's own choices and alternatives for avoiding
injury, the court argued that "[w]hile all risks cannot be eliminated
nor can a crash-proof vehicle be designed under the present state of
the art, there are many common-sense factors in design, which are or
should be well known to the manufacturer that will minimize or
174 Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502-05 (8th Cir. 1968).
175 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
176 Id. at 825; see also id. at 824 ("The intended purpose of an automobile does not include
its participation in collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee
the possibility that such collisions may occur.").
177 Larsen, 391 F.2d at 502; see also id. at 505 ("The normal risk of driving must be
accepted by the user but there is no need to further penalize the user by subjecting him to an
unreasonable risk of injury due to negligence in design." (footnote omitted)).
178 Id. at 502 (footnote omitted).
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lessen the injurious effects of a collision." '179
Certainly with a little effort one could distinguish the principle of
decision in Schneider from that in Larsen. What is interesting about
the juxtaposition of these two examples, however, is the dominant
mode of discourse that each represents. The general trend of factual
characterization in economic regulation cases is increasingly commu-
nalist-viewing victims as lacking in expertise, information, and alter-
natives, and emphasizing the injurer's knowledge of and responsibility
for harms even when they are indirect or remote, or result from the
confluence of several agencies. On the other hand, our decidedly pro-
speech interpretation of the first amendment law has rejected every
single one of these assumptions. The same plaintiff who is judged
comparatively helpless in consumer transactions is assumed to be suf-
ficiently responsible to take care of her own interests when faced with
potentially harmful expression. Those considered inexperienced and
disadvantaged in the marketplace of economics are deemed adept and
competent in the marketplace of ideas.
The point of this discussion is not to call for a reevaluation of first
amendment jurisprudence or of modem tort law, though perhaps
some readers might find one or the other desireable. My point is that
a background set of ideological assumptions undergirds our use of the
terms "responsibility" and "causation." We simply have a different
set of prejudices about who is doing what to whom and who is respon-
sible for it when we move from economic rights to expressive rights.
This difference no doubt explains the reactions that economic libertar-
ians 180 occasionally receive in more mainstream circles. Such think-
ers, who may hold the right of free contract almost as dear as that of
free speech, undergird their beliefs with a consistent series of back-
ground assumptions about who is responsible for the injuries and
losses that occur in a market economy. In fact, these beliefs are not
too dissimilar from the mainstream views regarding responsibility
with respect to speech. Nevertheless, the rhetoric of self-reliance
embedded in the metaphor of the marketplace of ideas has a distinctly
different political valence when it is applied to economic rights.
Similarly, I suspect that many traditional liberals find contempo-
179 Id. at 503.
180 See, e.g., R. Epstein, Takings (1985); R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974).
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rary feminist critiques of pornography18' disturbing simply because
these critiques refuse to take for granted traditional assumptions
about responsibility and causation in the context of speech. Radical
feminist arguments against pornography take a much more commu-
nalist attitude toward expressive conduct than many (male) lawyers
are accustomed to.
1 8 2
Because of its relatively communalist orientation, the radical femi-
nist critique adopts precisely the opposite rhetorical devices to
describe the responsibility of injurers and victims. The critique views
the pornographer as much more responsible for the foreseeable effects
of pornography on the attitudes of third parties who harm women.1
8 3
The critique emphasizes the harms that speech causes to the victim
class; the victim class is subjected to violent assaults, and society-wide
subordination and discrimination resulting from the structure of
male-female relations, which is perpetuated by the widespread availa-
bility of pornography. 8 4 Finally, this perspective portrays the victims
of pornography as lacking adequate alternatives to regulating pornog-
raphy; -5 they are viewed as trapped in a patriarchal system that pre-
vents their views from being heard and given credence.'8 6  This
argument thus rejects the claim that counter-speech without regula-
tion of pornography is an effective remedy to the harms caused by
pornography. 8 7 Taken as a whole, the radical feminist critique's
treatment of the harms accruing from pornographic speech bears a
remarkable structural similarity to the communalist rhetoric we nor-
mally hear in the field of economic regulation. Clearly the standard
mainstream legal ideology in this country characterizes responsibility
quite differently than does the worldview that animates the radical
feminist critique.
I8 E.g., C. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 125-213 (1987).
182 Note that the radical feminist position is relatively communalist only in the context of a
particular set of issues-the regulation of pornography. As to other situations in which
regulating speech is at issue, radical feminist thinkers may take just as individualist a position
as traditional liberals do.
183 C. MacKinnon, supra note 181, at 138, 156-57, 161-62, 171-72, 183-90, 199-200.
14 Id. at 138, 156-57, 161-62, 183-90, 199-200, 202.
185 Id. at 129-30, 140, 155-58.
186 Id. at 140, 155-58, 181-82.
187 Id. at 192-93.
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V. CONCLUSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND IDEOLOGY
It should be clear by now that the ways in which people character-
ize responsibility are deeply tied to their ideological beliefs. Indeed,
the examples in this Article suggest that a fruitful way to study ideol-
ogy is to look carefully at the various situations and conditions under
which people assign greater or lesser responsibility to actors.
Holding the members of a*particular group (whether injurers or
victims) more responsible is to emphasize their free will and available
alternatives, to manipulate time frames to emphasize inculpatory
facts, and (simultaneously) to deemphasize the responsibility, free
will, and available alternatives of others. This double movement is
important to recognize, for we do not hold everyone responsible for
everything any more than we think that everyone is blameless.
Responsibility is a concept understood through contrast and rela-
tion-in contrast to the responsibility of others, and in relation to
other concepts like fault, causation, free will, and available alterna-
tives. To the extent that we emphasize the responsibility of manufac-
turers for product-related injuries, we deemphasize the responsibility
of consumers for product misuse. To the extent that we believe that
the cause of poverty is individual sloth, we divert blame from social
practices and institutions.
The methods we use to characterize responsibility do not change as
we move from issues of consumer protection to criminal law to free
speech to abortion. The same techniques of individualist and commu-
nalist argument recur, and they can be used to generate the same
types of factual characterization and recharacterization. Ideology,
then, is reflected by how people choose characterizations of responsi-
bility in different social settings.
Responsibility and ideology also are connected through our atti-
tudes toward rights. The more we consider an activity or right (say
free speech or free contract) especially important and worth protect-
ing, the more we tend to deemphasize the responsibility of actors who
exercise that right for the harms that their activity causes to others.
Put in more familiar terms, the individualist position for a given right
opposes regulation of the right and characterizes the person exercising
it as not responsible for its effects on others. The harm created by the
exercise of the right is downplayed or deemphasized, and responsibil-
ity for the harm is placed on the victim class or third persons over
whom the person exercising the right is claimed to have no control.
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Conversely, the more we consider an activity or right as relatively
unimportant and undeserving of special treatment, the more we tend
to emphasize the responsibility of actors who exercise that right.
Thus, the communalist position for a given right supports regulation
of the right and characterizes the person exercising it as responsible
for its effects on others. The harm created by the exercise of the right
is highlighted and emphasized. The class of persons harmed by the
exercise of the right is characterized as relatively less responsible for
its predicament. Responsibility for the harm is placed instead on the
person exercising the right, both for her own actions and the actions
of third parties that harm the victim class.
The rhetorical devices used to stress or deemphasize the responsi-
bility of injurers and victims are the same regardless of the right
involved. Although the right at issue changes, the basic structure of
opposing factual characterizations does not. What does change is the
group of persons using individualist or communalist characterizations
for any particular right. Thus, another way to understand ideology is
to study the types of rhetorical devices used by people as they con-
sider different categories of rights.
The previous examples of contrasting rhetoric about speech and
contract rights should serve to indicate how we can illuminate the
study of ideology through understanding the basic devices of the rhet-
oric of responsibility. If, as I have argued, we can distinguish political
ideologies by the claims they make about rights and responsibilities,
then the rhetorical devices identified in this Article can be seen as the
building blocks of many different varieties of ideological argument.
This study of rhetorical devices is a quite different and yet, I believe,
quite important way to approach the study of ideology. Rather than
viewing ideological argument as a smokescreen hiding the real inter-
ests of actors, the study of the rhetoric of responsibility takes the
arguments that people make very seriously indeed. To understand
how we argue is to understand how we think, and thus how we pres-
ent the world to ourselves.
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